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Since the September 11, 2001 attacks al-Qaeda has been a forefront national 
security issue for the United States. This thesis is written by looking at how al-Qaeda 
perceives the international community and how they make their strategy. It attempts to 
answer the questions of how al-Qaeda creates their geostrategy and how influential jihad 
strategists are in this process, if al-Qaeda has a deterrence strategy, and finally can al-
Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
attain its goal in establishing the Caliphate. 
To answer these questions, a series of different case studies were conducted. In 
the first chapter an interpretive case study is used to analyze the impact of different jihad 
strategists on al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. In the second chapter two case studies were used 
that focus on strategic deterrence and dissuasion by denial. The final chapter uses al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS as case studies to evaluate the 
plausibility of the groups’ ability to create the Caliphate.  
The findings in each of the chapters helps to decipher and evaluate the 
effectiveness of al-Qaeda’s strategy. The first chapter finds that jihad strategists influence 
al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 geostrategy. The second chapter finds that al-Qaeda uses CBRN for 
offensive purposes and not for deterrence. However, in rare cases they have used terrorist 
attacks to deter their enemy. The third chapter argues that while ISIS and AQAP have 
been able to attain certain characteristics of a state and have been successful in holding 
influence in their respective areas of operation, it would be very unlikely that ISIS and 
AQAP will be able to successfully build their Caliphate. 
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This thesis aims to provide insight into the strategy and goals of al-Qaeda. Since 
the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, al-Qaeda has been thrusted into 
the spotlight. Many scholars have looked at the organization and theorized how to 
eradicate the group. A large amount of literature has been published about the strengths 
and weakness of the group, as well as different strategies on how to defeat them. What 
has received less attention from the academic community is al-Qaeda’s view of the West 
and what al-Qaeda’s strategists are writing. Additionally, scholars have conducted a lot of 
research conducted about how to deter the group. Here again, not many scholars have 
looked at how the group tries to deter the United States and the West from encroachment. 
Finally, it is the goal of many Salafi jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to create an Islamic State. Scholars have analyzed and 
hypothesized whether ISIS has already created a state, but there has been less literature 
focused on the plausibility of a Salafi jihadist group being able to attain a state in the 
future. The three chapters clarify and expand on these less researched topics.  
The chapters in this thesis are thematically linked by their focus on the strategy 
and goals of Salafi Jihadists terrorist organizations. Each chapter specifically addresses 
al-Qaeda, while the third addresses al-Qaeda and ISIS. Importantly, the chapters analyze 
al-Qaeda through a different lens. Instead of evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy or 
Western views of al-Qaeda, the focus of this thesis is too look how the group perceives 






Chapter one in this thesis aims to answer the question of how al-Qaeda creates its 
geostrategy and hypothesizes that jihad strategists directly impact the creation of al-
Qaeda’s geostrategy. In order to discern the impact jihad strategists have made, literature 
in terrorism studies was studied, as well as the strategic culture paradigm. This literature 
allowed for the evaluation of how effective jihad strategists’ theories are in influencing 
al-Qaeda affiliates’ strategy. The method used in this chapter was an interpretive case 
study. This allowed the author to analyze a multitude of information and data about al-
Qaeda and further develop and challenge the theoretical assumptions made by scholars 
about al-Qaeda’s geostrategy.  
The main jihad theorists analyzed in the chapter are Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who 
wrote The Global Islamic Resistance Call; Ayman al-Zawahiri for Knights Under the 
Prophets Banner; Abu Bakr Naji, for The Management of Savagery; and lastly Abu 
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s video Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Slaughters an American 
Infidel. Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones was chosen not to analyze because the focus is on the 
formation of al-Qaeda’s geostrategy post-September 11, 2001. While Qutb’s work 
heavily influenced al-Qaeda’s ideology, the more recent jihad theorists have had a larger 
impact on the group’s geostrategy.  
This chapter finds that strategic culture does impact al-Qaeda’s geostrategy, and 
due to al-Qaeda’s hierarchical and secretive nature, it is hard for al-Qaeda core to create a 
geostrategy and implement it throughout its various affiliates. The jihad theorists helped 
to fill this gap by writing about their life experiences fighting for al-Qaeda and 






al-Qaeda strategists’ geostrategies to particular affiliates. Each affiliate has a slightly 
different geostrategy that is exemplified by the differences between its individual 
strategists. Therefore, understanding the jihad strategists’ literature is imperative in 
understanding al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. 
The second chapter examines whether al-Qaeda uses dissuasion by denial as their 
deterrence strategy. The case studies used to determine this is its acquisition of chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and its use of terrorism as a 
deterrence strategy.  
In order to evaluate and analyze if al-Qaeda has a deterrence strategy, dissuasion 
by denial (DND) deterrence literature is researched. Two case studies were used as the 
method to determine whether DND was executed. The case studies also allow for the 
author to delve into the two different ways al-Qaeda may try to deter their enemies.  
The analysis section examines al-Qaeda’s attempts to acquire CBRN and the use 
of deterrence attacks to determine whether they align with dissuasion by denial strategy. 
The analysis demonstrates that al-Qaeda has shown that it is willing and believes it has 
the religious justification to use CBRN weapons against the West. In fact, in the data 
research every use of CBRN has been for offensive purposes. However, it was shown that 
al-Qaeda does not use CBRN as a dissuasion by denial tactic. Al-Qaeda has also used 
terrorist attacks as a means to deter their enemy and change political outcomes. This has 
had limited success and the example researched in this thesis that supports this assertion 






The final chapter evaluates the plausibility of a Salafi Jihadist group attaining 
their goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Salafist Jihadist groups includes al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Salafism maintains that Islam should be 
practiced as it was during the earliest stages of Islam under the Prophet Mohammad. 
Jihadism is the idea that Muslims have a duty to practice Jihad, which is religiously 
sanctioned warfare. Salafi Jihadism is a combination of the two. It takes the jihad 
approach of violence with the religious adherence to Salafism.1 
This chapter examines ISIS and al-Qaeda’s affiliate group in Yemen, al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Both of these groups have some characteristics of a state. 
In order to evaluate whether it has achieved its goal of a caliphate and/or whether it can 
achieve this goal, literature is researched about the characteristics of a state. There are 
three main characteristics that a state must have: sovereignty, a political unit, and 
territory. These characteristics were used this to evaluate ISIS and AQAP.  
For my methods section a case study of the two groups was used. The author 
compares the triumphs of the group to the characteristics needed for a state. Also 
analyzed was ISIS and AQAP’s strengths and weaknesses. The analysis showed that 
neither group was able to successfully attain the necessary characteristics to form a state 
nor is it likely that either will be able to do so. Ultimately, ISIS and AQAP had attained 
certain characteristics of a state, but did not meet the qualifications of statehood.    
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Chapter 1: The Formation of al-Qaeda’s Geostrategy: The Impact 
of Jihad Strategists 
 
Introduction: 
 Al-Qaeda has been a forefront issue for the United States since the September 11, 
2001 attacks. The group has affiliates and exerts influence all around the world, and the 
United States has spent the past 15 years trying to combat it. Al-Qaeda is a unique 
organization due to the high literacy level of its membership and its deep seeded 
ideology. While most terrorist groups are more tactical, al-Qaeda is very prolific and 
jihad scholars write long books, manuscripts, poems, and doctrine on how to carryout 
jihad.  
This chapter is aimed at discovering whether or not jihad strategists influenced al-
Qaeda’s geostrategy. Zbigniew Brzezinski notes in his book The Grand Chessboard that 
active geostrategic players are states that have the capacity and the national will to 
exercise their influence beyond their borders to alter the existing geopolitical state of 
affairs.2 In order to understand al-Qaeda’s geostrategy, one must understand their 
ideology of Salafi Islam or Salafism and their culture. Each has a unique background and 
upbringing and their contributions have directly impacted the creation of al-Qaeda core’s 
geostrategy. The author further hypothesizes that the difference in geostrategies between 
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al-Qaeda affiliates and al-Qaeda core can be attributed to the influence of different jihad 
strategists.   
 This chapter will start by examining the different bodies of literature produced in 
this field. Notably, only a few scholars have written about jihad strategists and its impact 
on geostrategy. After there is a discussion of the methods used to evaluate the different 
literature written by these jihad strategists and then the theory for the paper will be 
discussed. The data section will summarize the different jihad strategist literatures. The 
chapter will end with the analysis section which will discuss the findings, and then the 
conclusion to recap the proposed hypothesis.  
Literature Review 
Analyzing how al-Qaeda creates its geostrategy is an area in which few scholars 
have published. A more typical article or monograph produced about al-Qaeda’s strategy 
instead compares al-Qaeda to US or western strategy and analyzes those differences. 
Instead, this chapter emphasizes how al-Qaeda internally creates its geostrategy and the 
impact that ideology and jihad strategists have on its geostrategy. Therefore, since few 
scholars have written about the subject matter this thesis draws from a number of 
different literature paradigms.  
 The first paradigm with relevance to this thesis is terrorism studies. In order to 
understand terrorism studies, it is important to define terrorism. In Bruce Hoffman’s 
seminal book Inside Terrorism, he defines terrorism as follows: “All terrorist acts involve 
violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching 
psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is 






include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or 
political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where 
there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity 
generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power 
they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.”3 
Terrorist groups can be comprised of a variety of sizes and have varying levels of 
capabilities, and motives. Interestingly, terrorism studies focuses on a variety of issues 
including ideological motives, radicalization, and places particular emphasis on 
combating terrorism. While al-Qaeda uses terrorism as an operational and tactical 
strategy, the author examines the group from a new angle that does not fit completely 
within this paradigm. Previous works emphasize understanding al-Qaeda’s ideology, 
since it is an important motive for the group’s formation and actions. The author instead 
places more emphasis on understanding how al-Qaeda creates its strategy and the impact 
that jihad strategists have on its overarching strategy. Furthermore, the chapter aims to 
decipher the different levels on which geostrategy is present in al-Qaeda.   
One paradigm that was useful in developing an understanding of al-Qaeda’s 
geostrategy and ideology is strategic culture. Alastair Johnston is one of the most 
prominent and foundational scholars of this paradigm. He argues that states “have 
predominant strategic preferences that are enrooted in the early formation of the state, 
and are influenced by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the 
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state and its elite.”4 He also emphasizes analyzing the historical events and trends of a 
state to understand its strategic culture. This was particularly useful in helping explain al-
Qaeda’s ideology. The birth of al-Qaeda can be traced back to 1988 when Osama bin 
Laden and his top associates met in Pakistan to discuss the birth of the global jihad. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Afghanistan had been in turmoil and was invaded by 
the Soviet Union; causing stronger tension in the region. The presence of the Soviet 
Union fueled hatred toward western values, which has stayed at the core of al-Qaeda’s 
ideology since its inception. Understanding the history of al-Qaeda and the birth of its 
ideology is imperative in understanding its motives and geostrategy. Where my thesis 
differs from Johnston’s article is that Johnston argues that only states can have a strategic 
culture. While al-Qaeda is a non-state actor, I argue that due to globalization, 
technological advances, and the evolution of conflict, strategic culture now plays a part in 
developing al-Qaeda’s strategy. 
 Furthermore, articles that were useful and relevant in the paradigm of strategic 
culture was written by the Joint Special Operations University titled “Strategic Culture 
and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global 
Jihad Movement” and an article by Jerry Long titled “Strategic Culture and Violent Non-
State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and 
Cases: Chapter 2: Strategic Culture, Al-Qaeda, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
These articles are two of the few published articles that directly related to this thesis. 
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Both emphasized the importance that strategic culture plays in al-Qaeda’s strategy, and 
unlike Johnston, both authors argue that strategic culture impacts more than just the state. 
The JSOU study notes that while strategic cultural framework has been deemed by some 
inappropriate when referring to armed groups because they are non-state actors, however 
over the past two decades there has been a paradigm shift on the causes and conflicts of 
war.5 Because of this, groups like al-Qaeda have enhanced capabilities due to 
globalization and modern technology, and this allows them to reach both its local and 
global audience – enabling them to cause geopolitical damage. Comparably, Jerry Long 
argues that a nation is a more susceptible international relations unit to strategic culture 
analysis.6 One example that Long uses is the discourse between Iraqi Sunni and Shia 
militants. He explains that they are not merely combatants in a state’s civil war, but two 
nations who battle each other.7 Each faction is culturally different, with its own 
narratives. 
The monograph by JSOU elucidates the importance of understanding strategic 
culture, and how it sets the boundaries on how a community views the world and 
conducts its mission.8 Additionally, strategic culture also includes professional discourse 
over strategy, doctrine, operational art, and related issues.9 One of the focuses of this 
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thesis is al-Qaeda’s view of the international community, and the method is reading 
through literature produced by jihad strategists and dissecting its doctrine.  
The JSOU article also articulates the importance of understanding Salafi Islam, 
and how it plays a part in its formation of geostrategy. In the monograph the authors 
explain that there are three component parts of strategic culture: common experiences, 
historical narrative, and shared beliefs; threats and challenges to shared beliefs and modes 
of behavior; and ends and means for protecting beliefs and values and achieving security 
objectives.10 Salafi Islam is a central part of al-Qaeda’s historical narrative and shared 
beliefs. Al-Qaeda has spearheaded the resurgence of Salafi Islam in the 20th century and 
directly tied this fundamentalist pillar of Islam to its ideology and geostrategy. 
Additionally, in the books and doctrine written by Jihad strategists, quotes and poems 
from the Quran are widespread.  
Ideology plays an integral part in al-Qaeda’s strategic culture, and Long echoes 
this sentiment in his article. Long explains that al-Qaeda practices Salafi Islam because it 
is taught and implemented as a powerful ethnic marker that trumps state identification.11 
Long explains how the classical view of Islam and the role of Jihad emerged from the 
Abbasid caliphate. During this formation of doctrine, there was a divide between those 
who believed and those who didn’t believe in Islam. As Islam began to spread, the people 
did not focus on converting the populous, but instead emphasized conveying that Islam 
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was the superior religion.12 During this time Islamic jurists also started to debate the rules 
of warfare and what constituted a threat against Islam, and the permissibility of collateral 
damage. Al-Qaeda’s formulation of doctrine drew from this classical doctrine. While 
Usama bin Laden functioned as a mujtahid, a person who gives independent 
interpretation to Islamic texts, his interpretations were still bound by the historical and 
religious tradition of the doctrine and the set parameters within which he could move.13 
Therefore, it is very important to understand the parallels between classical doctrine and 
al-Qaeda’s doctrine, especially when relating to its geostrategy.   
As mentioned above, ideology is a crucial motivator for al-Qaeda and 
understanding its ideology is imperative to understanding its geostrategy. Strong 
Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World, written by Gabriel Almond, 
Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, explains fundamentalism and examines the 
emergence of fundamentalist right wing groups. Al-Qaeda’s ideology, Salafism or Salafi 
Islam, is a fundamentalist ideology and therefore understanding fundamentalism is 
central to understanding al-Qaeda’s strategic culture. The authors define fundamentalism 
as, “a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled ‘true believers’ 
attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious 
community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”14 This 
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definition describes al-Qaeda’s ideology, especially since al-Qaeda aims to call all people 
to join the global jihad, and have Salafi Islam be the rule of law.  
Secularization has been a major structural cause for many fundamentalist groups’ 
emergence. Sunni fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda add another layer of complexity 
because they are anti-secular, very nationalistic, and have unified hatred towards the 
west.15 In short, al-Qaeda feels its way of life is being threatened by societal 
advancement. Since most of the advancement is made by the west, its disdain for the west 
only heightens, which strengthens its ideology.  
Theory 
 
This chapter is aimed at discovering how al-Qaeda creates its geostrategy and 
hypothesizes that jihad strategists directly impact the creation of al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. 
The theory used to evaluate the formation of geostrategy is balance of power theory and 
the caveat of polarization. When deciphering the different literature produced by jihad 
strategists it became evident that jihad strategists view the world from a very realist point 
of view. In fact, when reading through its literature there are hints of Cold War rhetoric 
dispersed throughout the texts. Balance of power theory dictates that once a state 
becomes too powerful, balancing will occur.16 This is meant that the opposing force, or 
pole, will begin to build up capabilities, like their military, to lessen the hegemon’s 
power. Additionally, the international system can be structured as a unipolar world, 
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where one hegemon as a leader, bipolar, where there are two equal opposing forces, and 
multipolar, where there are three or more influential forces.  
The jihad strategists see the world as being bi-polar system, in which jihad is 
opposing western ideology. Donald Capps wrote an article that discusses how religions 
groups use the bi-polar model to emphasize two opposing religious expressions.17 When 
bi-polar models are based on religion, one group typically beleives that their religion is 
pure and genuine, while the other is contaminated. Furthermore, al-Qaeda believes that 
they are standing up to the United States’ ideology and giving the international 
community the option to counter the US.  Jihad strategists also believe that they will 
defeat the US and the US will fall. When this happens, they want al-Qaeda to be the 
opposing force that everyone joins.  
Methods 
Researching how al-Qaeda forms its geostrategy has been a difficult task since 
there is minimal literature written by western scholars that summarizes how al-Qaeda 
creates strategy. One argument that scholars seem to agree on is that al-Qaeda does not 
produce grand strategy; instead they produce strategy at the local or command level. 
Therefore, it is important to find the material created by jihad strategists that ultimately 
creates al-Qaeda’s strategy. After doing in-depth contextual and cultural research and 
reading a multitude of books, articles, and letters written by jihad strategists, there are 
five strategists who influence al-Qaeda’s geostrategy the most. These strategists are: Abu 
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Mus’ab al-Suri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Bakr Naji, and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. In 
order to be able to analyze this material effectively, an interpretive case study will be 
used to dissect the different works produced by the five strategists mentioned earlier. 
Germane  
Using an interpretive case study as one of the methods allows the author to 
analyze a multitude of information and data to further develop and challenge the 
theoretical assumptions made by scholars about al-Qaeda’s geostrategy.18 The benefit of 
doing a single case study is that one can delve deeply into the case study and develop a 
strong understanding of the subject matter.19 A strong and well-researched case study can 
prove or disprove a hypothesis or theory. In reference to the thesis, the author analyzes 
how one of the largest Islamic terrorist groups, al-Qaeda, forms its geostrategy. 
Researching and analyzing how jihad strategists impact al-Qaeda’s geostrategy will help 
decipher how al-Qaeda creates and deploys its geostrategy, and also how it views the 
international community as a whole. The interpretive case study allows the author to 
ascertain the jihad strategist’s motivations and view of the world, and find the 
commonalities among different books, doctrine, and strategy.  
Data/Doctrine 
 The data section of this chapter summarizes the different themes of literature 
produced by jihad strategists. As mentioned earlier, the five jihad strategists that have had 
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great influence on al-Qaeda’s geostrategy: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who is most known for 
The Global Islamic Resistance Call; Ayman al-Zawahiri for Knights Under the Prophets 
Banner; Abu Bakr Naji, for The Management of Savagery; and lastly Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi’s video Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Slaughters an American Infidel. All of 
these products have helped to create new aspects and theories in al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri 
 Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, also known by his nom de guerre, 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, is recognized as the leading al-Qaeda theoretician and strategic 
thinker post September 11, 2001 and is best known for his 1,604-page book Call to 
Global Islamic Resistance (GIR). 20  GIR has reshaped al-Qaeda’s strategy post 9/11 and 
has made al-Suri an integral member in forming al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. GIR calls for all 
Muslims to join the global Jihad and lays out how each person can join and affect the 
cause.  Furthermore, GIR’s wide dissemination across jihad websites, forums, and 
training camps has enabled it to reach all levels of the global jihad and acts as a guide on 
how jihadis should carry out attacks.   
 Throughout GIR, al-Suri lays the framework of how jihadis should view and 
attack the west, placing particular emphasis on the poisons of the United States’ ideology 
and support of Israel. The framework that al-Suri lays out emphasizes that in order to 
combat the Crusaders, Muslims must create a system, which he named the Global Islamic 
Resistance system. This system is bound by “a common name and a personal oath to God 
the Supreme Leader on adhering to Him, a political-judicial program, a common 
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doctrine, and an oath to God on committing to it, and finally a common goal, which is to 
resist the invaders and their allies, and an oath to God on jihad in His way to defeat them, 
then to work on establishing His rule.”21 With this overarching framework as the central 
mission for GIR, al-Suri breaks down the different “units” that make up this one mission.  
One of the most influential units that had the largest effect on al-Qaeda’s 
geostrategy is al-Suri’s military theory of the Resistance Call. He emphasizes that that 
military theory is based upon two forms of jihad: “the Individual Terrorism Jihad and 
secret operational activity of small units totally separate from each other, and the 
Participation in jihad at the Open Fronts.”22  Here, al-Suri created the new strategic 
concept of individual terrorism that has altered al-Qaeda’s recruitment tactics and 
geostrategy. He argues that due to al-Qaeda’s hierarchical nature, attracting youths is 
difficult. His goal for individual terrorism is to produce mass mobilization and 
participation in jihad.23 Additionally, the use of individual terrorism helps to create an 
open front, which is where the influence on geostrategy lies. Al-Suri argues that while 
individual terrorism can be performed anywhere, the Open Front Jihad depends on 
strategic preconditions in order for it to succeed.24 These preconditions are: geographic 
considerations, population, and the political situation in the nation. Only when the 
conditions for all three factors and variables are met can the Open Front Jihad succeed. 
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Furthermore, al-Suri notes that the priority of areas should be wherever one can hurt the 
enemy the most and whenever one can rouse Muslims the most and awaken their 
spirits.25 When trying to attack the Crusaders, al-Suri argues that top targets should 
include economic targets, diplomatic, economic interests, athletic and tourist, and 
military bases.26  
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
 Ayman al-Zawahiri is the current amir of al-Qaeda and was the second in 
command during Usama bin Laden’s rule. Al-Zawahiri has influenced al-Qaeda’s 
geostrategy through is book Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner and through multiple 
videos broadcasted to jihadi followers. Al-Zawahiri lays emphasis that in order to have a 
successful jihad movement; the global arena needs to “act as an incubator where its seeds 
would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and 
organization matters.”27 This also aligns with al-Suri’s preconditions for the Open Front. 
Both strategists argue that these are environments where jihad will prosper the most.  
 Additionally, al-Zawahiri emphasized the ‘far enemy.’ Here is where he 
emphasizes that the enemies are abroad (US and allies), not the ‘near enemy.” He blames 
the Arab and Western media for distorting the images of the Arab Afghans by portraying 
them as crazed men.28 Al-Zawahiri views the United Nations, Arab rulers, multinational 
corporations, the internet, international news and satellite media, and international relief 
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organizations, as the most important targets, since they are the ones distorting the jihad 
image and are trying to combat al-Qaeda.29  He calls for the jihadis to attack these targets 
and when doing so to inflict maximum casualties, and concentrate on the method of 
martyrdom. Additionally, the targets and method of weapons must be chosen to have 
largest impact and to deter the enemy and stop its brutality.30 Furthermore, al-Zawahiri 
notes that in order to mobilize the masses to carry out these attacks, the movement needs: 
“a leadership that they could trust, follow, and understand, a clear enemy to strike, and 
the shackles of fear and the impediments of weakness in the souls must be broken.”31 
These are all strategies that al-Zawahiri is employing, which shows insight on how al-
Zawahiri views the international community, and the enemies of al-Qaeda.  
A letter has been published that al-Zawahiri wrote to al-Zarqawi on October 11, 
2005. In his letter al-Zawahiri emphasizes the importance of preparing for the American 
demise, and how to set up the Jihad in the region. He argues that the mujahedeen must be 
the nucleus of the region, where tribes, people in positions, scientists, merchants, and 
people of opinion, could gather and discuss issues.32 Al-Zawahiri notes that the Taliban’s 
weaknesses are their exclusivity and restricted participation, and that al-Qaeda instead 
must compel people to join the jihad movement by letting its voice be heard.  
Abu Bakr Naji 
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 Abu Bakr Naji wrote The Management of Savagery in 2004, where he addresses 
the struggles of the jihad movements and believes that the solution to its failure is to 
create the Islamic State, or as referred to in his book, the caliphate.33 He remarks that 
jihad groups mismanaged resources, recruits and violence.34 He intends to create the 
caliphate by overthrowing every government and making them subscribe to shariah law. 
One of Naji’s tactics for doing this is to discredit the United States so that Muslims who 
support them will instead support militant Muslims.  
Additionally, Naji suggests a technique of vexation and exhaustion to defeat the 
enemy.35 The first step of doing this is one must exhaust the forces of the enemy and 
continue to recruit new youth to work on operations. Naji emphasizes the importance of 
political action and that the most important political principle is the principle of self-
interest.36 He argues that, “There is no eternal enmity in politics and no eternal 
friendship; rather, there are eternal interests. Therefore, the difference of interests among 
them is a cause for the bloodiest wars.”37 
The second is one must ensure that the current regime topples to put the state in 
near anarchy, or “savagery.”38 In fact, this state of chaos described resembles Thomas 
Hobbes Leviathan, and his state of nature without a government. With that said, Hobbes 
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does argue that the sovereign authority does trump religious motives, which Naji would 
disagree with. 
The final phase of the vexation and exhaustion strategy is the advancement of 
groups of vexation to be trained physically and psychologically for the final stage of 
management of savagery.39 Once savagery and chaos erupt, Islamists can enter the area to 
provide food and medical treatment, security, establish shariah law, and indoctrinate and 
train the society to fight.40 This would help instill the jihad motives and bring the state 
out of chaos.  In addition, all of the attacks are in the hope that America will invade the 
Middle East. This is where the jihadis will fight and defend their land and religion, and 
thus will be a propaganda victory.41 Naji does understand that the jihadis will not be able 
to defeat a direct military intervention, but in the short term this will cause propaganda 
victories, and in the long term, the US will begin to splinter.  
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
 Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and is best 
known for his violent and ruthless operational strategy. When al-Zarqawi moved to 
Afghanistan in 1989 he fell under the guidance of al-Maqdisi. When they both returned to 
Jordan they were arrested. Throughout his time in jail Zarqawi emerged past his spiritual 
mentor and left as a ruthless leader.42 During his time in Iraq he commanded over a 
thousand jihadis and was adamant about communicating jihad to the rest of the world. 






 Jarret Brachman and William McCants. “Stealing Al-Qaeda Playbook” USMA CTC Report. February 1, 
2006 , 7 https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/stealing-al-qaidas-playbook 
42
George Michael. "The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." Defence Studies 7, no. 3: 






Through his propaganda strategy, he was able to mount international media events at the 
ground level.43 While the other strategists mentioned above used books and doctrine to 
attract members, al-Zarqawi used the internet. One of his famous videos Sheikh Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi Slaughters an American Infidel, shows him beheading an American. 
These videos escalated the brutality and ruthlessness of the jihad movement. Al-
Zarqawi’s argument was that this would deter countries from invading the region.44   
 Additionally, al-Zarqawi’s most significant geostrategic contribution was he 
employed massive suicide and bombing campaigns that were meant to instill fear into the 
infidels. The hope was that these videos would be broadcasted across the web and would 
incite the Ummah (worldwide Muslim community) to join the movement. In fact, suicide 
car bombings in Iraq increased from 133 in 2004 to 411 in 2005, and most of these were 
linked to jihadis inspired by al-Zarqawi.45  
 Al-Zarqawi had a turbulent relationship with al-Qaeda core and knew that 
because bin Laden was trapped in Pakistan and Afghanistan he would be able to have 
more independence. With this said, he was still invaluable to al-Qaeda because he was 
able to successfully recruit and execute operations in the region. Additionally, Al-
Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi did have a close relationship, but al-Zawahiri was worried that 
al-Zarqawi was too ruthless. In fact, on October 11, 2005 al-Zawahiri wrote a letter to al-
Zarqawi explaining al-Qaeda’s strategy and its status to the road of jihad. Towards the 
end of this letter he warns al-Zarqawi about scenes of slaughter and says, “Among the 
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things which the feeling of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never 
find palatable – also – are the scenes of slaughtering hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived 
by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the 
shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and 
the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing 
of God.”46 This is particularly important because it not only shows al-Qaeda core’s 
disapproval of slaughter, and since AQI morphed into ISIL, it helps illuminate the 
fundamental differences between the two groups.  
Analysis 
 The analysis section of this chapter dissects the different literatures mentioned in 
the Data section. During this section analyze the direct correlation between jihad 
strategists and al-Qaeda’s geostrategy, explain that creation of geostrategy is inherently 
individualistic in al-Qaeda, and finally that the difference in geostrategies between al-
Qaeda affiliates can be linked back to the differences in jihad strategists.  
The International System Seen through the Eyes of Jihad Strategists 
Before talking about how al-Qaeda forms its geostrategy, it is important to 
understand how al-Qaeda views the international community. One common characteristic 
throughout the different literatures mentioned in this chapter and in the theory section of 
this paper is that the jihad strategists see the world as bi-polar. As previously discussed, 
this has implications for al-Qaeda’s geostrategy because the strategists believe that they 
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are creating a system in which they balance against the United States. By taking this 
approach al-Qaeda strategists also emphasize the inherent extremism of its ideology.    
In Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance Call he categorizes people 
into four different groups based on its beliefs. The first category is In-Group 1, the 
Jihadis. These people are comprised of a limited group of committed jihadists and where 
al-Suri considers himself. Then there is In-Group 2, which is comprised of Muslim 
Ummah. The two Out-Groups are characterized as Out-Group 1, which is the Crusader-
West and Out-Group 2 which are non-Jihadist Muslims.47 Al-Suri uses the four groups to 
depict the different actors in the international community. By characterizing ideology and 
beliefs into four different groups, al-Suri has created an international community in 
which one is either jihadi or Muslim Ummah, or in the Out-Group.  
 In Al-Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Prophets Banner, the author speaks about the 
fundamentalist movement and emphasizes that since the assassination of Anwar al 
Mujahideen (Sadat), there has been an increased resistance against the fundamentalist 
movement by governments.48 Al-Zawahiri explains that there are two powers in play: the 
first is supported by the United States, the west, Israel, and most Arab Rules; the second 
depends on God alone and the alignment of jihad movements.49 Al-Zawahiri believes that 
jihad will resist the first power by not only inspiring the hearts of the Muslim youth, but 
by increasing jihad action to strike and harm any US and Jewish interests. Additionally, 
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he believes that the first powers’ motives are to remove Islam from power and keep it 
away from aspects of life as well as to open up countries to the enemies of Islam, 
Americans and Jews, through peace agreements and treaties.50 Al-Zawahiri went on to 
say, “It is a battle of ideologies, a struggle for survival, and a war with no truce.”51 
 Abu Bakr Naji view on polarization is very similar to al-Suri and al-Zawahiri, but 
he takes his view step further. In his book The Management of Savagery, he says, “By 
polarization here, I mean dragging the masses into the battle such that polarization is 
created between all the people. Thus, one group of them will go to the side of truth, and 
another group will go to the side of the people of falsehood, and the third will remain 
neutral, awaiting the outcome of the battle in order to join the victor. We must attract the 
sympathy of this group and make it hope for the victory of the people of faith, especially 
since this group has a decisive role in the later stages of the present battle.”52 This is 
important because one of Naji’s stated goals is trying to reach out to this population and 
target them for recruitment.  
 The implication of understanding how jihad strategists see the world, is that it 
helps to identify how it is trying to combat the enemy. As seen above by three of the 
scholars discussed in this paper, the jihad strategists not only view their enemy as 
America, the west and Israel, but anyone who is not jihad. Al-Suri takes the largest 
liberty in his groupings since he has four different categories, but in the end, it is still the 
pure jihadist versus non-Muslims.  
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Common Jihad Strategies 
 Al-Qaeda’s overarching geostrategy is that in order to establish an Islamic 
caliphate, it must defeat the United States. By this, it does not mean militarily defeat, as 
they know that this is unfeasible, but instead its strategy is to “cut the head off the snake, 
or cutting the wings off.” This phrase is a military strategy that has been used by the 
media and government officials to indicate disabling leadership or key influencers to 
shorten hostilities.53 It has been used throughout jihad literature and was referenced in 
letters found in Usama bin Laden’s compound. One of the letters that was addressed to 
Abu Basir said, “America is the head of nonbelievers… if God cuts off the head, the 
wings will be weakened.”54 The meaning of this statement is that if al-Qaeda defeats the 
United States, as they defeated the Soviet Union during the Cold War, western power will 
weaken, and due to the bipolar nature of the system, Muslims will choose to join the 
jihad. This thought can also be compared to a reverse domino effect, in which if the west 
falls, everyone will be more susceptible to join the jihad. 
 Additionally, al-Suri, al-Zawahiri, and Naji all preached in its literature that one 
of its geostrategies is to attack America with the aim that America would retaliate and 
send troops into the region. They all heavily discuss the operating environment that it 
needs to succeed. For example, the reason why it wants America to come into the region 
is so that through propaganda campaigns they can show America’s brutality and win over 
the hearts of the people in the region. It also knows its territory, people, and culture better 
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than the US. Al-Suri’s preconditions for the Open Front come into play here. Individual 
terrorists can instill fear by a single act, but the open front requires a strategy in order to 
succeed along with the proper preconditions that al-Suri laid out. First, the location must 
be favorable to the jihadis. Al-Suri suggests a place that is spacious, difficult to besiege, 
and mountainous.55 Second, the population should have a large number of inhabitants 
who movements cannot be registered. The youth should also be able to fight and have 
sources of weapons. Third, the more unrest in the political climate, the more people are 
susceptible to jihad.56 Understanding these conditions are important because this is how 
al-Qaeda believes jihad will succeed. In fact, al-Suri notes that that the best places for the 
open front are Afghanistan, countries in Central Asia and vicinities that lie behind the 
river, Yemen, Morocco and North Africa, and the Levant and Iraq.57  Al-Qaeda has 
targeted these areas to exert its influence and in fact, has set up affiliate groups in those 
regions. This shows the relevance and impact that al-Suri’s geostrategy has had on al-
Qaeda. 
 Alternatively, the strategists also stress the importance of striking America’s 
homeland. Al-Zawahiri emphasizes the term ‘far enemy’ as he believes that it is time to 
move the front abroad. In his book he says, “We must move the battle to the enemy’s 
ground, to burn the hands of those who ignite fire in our countries.”58 This aligns with the 
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individual terrorist strategy that al-Suri discusses. The hope is by striking the American 
homeland, they will be able to weaken the regime, and create awareness of the United 
States’ evilness. An example of this strategy’s use by al-Qaeda is the attack on September 
11, 2001. With this said, al-Zawahiri also states that there are times that it is important to 
keep the jihad at home and to defend their land and influence.  
Furthermore, al-Suri, al-Zawahiri, Naji and al-Zarqawi note the importance of 
using the internet and media for the call to jihad. They believe they can incite anti-
American rhetoric that will force the Americans to withdraw their influence, like the 
Soviets did during the Cold War. The jihadis will then step in and provide for their 
people. This is why the creation of online jihad websites and forums has been so 
influential and so important to al-Qaeda. While the strategists recognize that they will not 
be able to defeat a direct military confrontation, Naji mentions that if they can exert a 
strong propaganda campaign, in the short term this will cause propaganda victories, and 
in the long term, the US will begin to splinter. Interestingly, al-Qaeda sees its propaganda 
campaign as failing compared to the United States. In numerous literatures, there have 
been references to the strength of America’s media campaign is and the need to combat it 
more effectively. 
Additionally, al-Suri, al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi, Naji, and al-Zarqawi all agree that 
the current regimes in the Middle East need to be toppled since they do not support and 
enforce jihad. Al-Qaeda see these leaders interact with the international community, and 
believes they are enablers to America’s power. This is seen as a betrayal to jihad. Any 






why al-Qaeda has targeted key figures in nation’s governments, and additionally it helps 
to explain the impact of its ideology. Even though these leaders are Muslim, since are not 
jihadists, they are enabling the enemy. This belief directly correlates with al-Qaeda’s 
geostrategy to target such leaders in hope that by cutting the head off the snake, the 
regime will fall. An example of this is the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who 
was an Afghan political and military leader who denounced the fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam.  
 Jihad strategists also agree on common targets that the jihadis should focus on. 
These targets include the Heads of States, diplomatic figures, economic targets, military 
bases, sporting events, hotels, the United Nations, and international media 
organizations.59  One can see from the attacks that al-Qaeda has carried out that there is 
correlation between the targets mentioned in the book and the attacks. Also, one can 
associate these targets with western values and culture, which the strategists see has a 
threat to jihad and feel that they must defend jihad.   
 It is evident that there is a strong correlation between the jihad strategists’ 
literature and al-Qaeda’s geostrategy. By examining the theories presented by the 
different strategists, one can discern that they have altered the way that al-Qaeda acts in 
the international community, and have created and reaffirmed al-Qaeda’s geostrategy.  
Individualistic Nature of Geostrategy 
 After reviewing the different literatures and analyzing its content, one can see the 
direct correlation between al-Qaeda’s geostrategy and these jihad strategists. 
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Interestingly, this also reveals the individualistic manner in which geostrategy is created 
in al-Qaeda. Due to the hierarchical and secretive nature of the group, it is hard for the 
leaders to create strategy and disseminate it to the camps and individuals. This is 
especially true for Usama bin Laden, who was in hiding since the 9/11 attacks until his 
death in 2012. Since al-Qaeda leaders are worried that their locations and 
communications are being tracked by the Intelligence Community, they can only 
communicate through very secure means, and thus inconvenient. The creations of online 
forums and magazines such as Inspire have helped to spread the message, but it is the 
jihadi strategist’s literature that has made the largest impact in forming al-Qaeda’s 
geostrategy.  
Additionally, not only are its publications and doctrine disseminated at various 
levels of al-Qaeda, but they are written like training manuals. All of the publications are 
very methodical in their explanations on exactly who to target and which methods to use. 
They also are filled with poems from other scholars and the Quran. Poetry is an integral 
part of Islamic culture and can be traced back to the Abbasid Caliphate.60 This is 
important to highlight because it shows how the strategic culture of the jihad plays a part 
in the strategist’s books and article. Moreover, these strategies are disseminated at 
various levels of the organization so they reach a wide audience.  
Correlation between Jihad Strategists and Salafi Jihadist Organizations  
 After reviewing the different strategists’ literature, one can see that certain 
strategists’ geostrategy can be linked to al-Qaeda affiliates’ actions. It is, however, more 
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difficult to find direct correlations between the strategies that the theorists purposed and 
the action taken at the operational level of the group. In fact, some scholars argue that the 
strategists like to imagine themselves as operational planners for the global jihad, but the 
decentralization of the organization makes it harder to see clear-cut correlations between 
the strategies of the theorist and actual operations carried out by the group.61 As Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross said in his recent article, “Jihadist groups rarely, if ever, wholesale re-
embrace their strategists of yesteryear. Rather, these strategists’ principles might be re-
examined, and applied in new ways to new circumstances.”62 Because of this, al-Qaeda 
and their affiliates are influenced by evolving strategic through.63 
Perhaps the most influential jihad theorist who impacted al-Qaeda geostrategy 
was Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. Two of al-Qaeda’s large attacks in the mid-2000s were 
connected with al-Suri’s doctrine. Both the Madrid bombing and London attacks were 
executed in the same matter that al-Suri outlined in the GIR on how to build cells. He 
believed that participation in society should be an active individual with a security, 
cultural, and religious eligibility to influence a wide circle of friends.64 In regards to the 
Madrid bombing, Tunisian immigrant Sahrane Fahket and Moroccan immigrant Jamal 
Zougam built their own cell in Madrid. Fahket was a real estate agent and Zougam ran a 
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mobile phone shop.65  In regards to the London bombing, Mohammed Khan was a 
primary school teacher who drew three young students into a jihadist cell.66 
In al-Suri’s GIR, he also emphasized the model of individual jihad or individual 
terrorism. This is the idea that individual terrorism needed to replace the hierarchical 
organization of the group. This is an approach that ISIS has taken in its effort to build a 
Caliphate. ISIS has continually emphasized the importance of lone-wolf attacks. In order 
to encourage these types of attacks ISIS strategists even put a Just Terrorism Tactic 
section in its publication Rumiyah, which outlines different ways a citizen can conduct an 
attack.  
The use of brutality by exhibited by al-Zarqawi’s and how it has been 
incorporated as a main characteristic of the Islamic State. As mentioned earlier, al-
Zawahiri warned al-Zarqawi against the increased use of brutality. Al-Zarqawi was the 
head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and urged and used tactics that were much more graphic and 
violent. After al-Zarqawi was killed al-Baghdadi replaced him and created ISIL. This is 
one of the most fundamental differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda. Although, he did 
help transform al-Qaeda’s geostrategy by increasing the use of suicide bombings as a 
tactical strategy. This has been widely used since 9/11.    
 Additionally, Abu Bakr Naji deviated from al-Qaeda core’s geostrategy. In the 
“Management of Savagery” Naji speaks about how to create a state of savagery and 








promotes using attacks in other regions to relieve the pressure on jihadist safe havens.67 
Naji also emphasizes manipulating and using the media. One can see correlation between 
the cities that ISIS has taken and Naji’s strategy.   
Alternatively, the literature produced by al-Zawahiri fits al-Qaeda’s core’s overall 
geostrategy. In regards to Zawahiri, it is indicative that his geostrategy is at the heart of 
al-Qaeda core since he replaced Usama bin Laden as the emir after his death. When he 
wrote Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, it was while he was still second in command. 
In his book, Zawahiri emphasized that a jihadist movement needs an arena that acts as an 
incubator. He argues here that jihadism needs to be kept separately from nationalism. He 
also called for random acts of violence by individuals in America.  What sets Zawahiri 
apart from some of the other theorists is his emphasize on attacking the far enemy. Many 
of the other jihad theorists focus on building an operating environment that is conducive 
for jihad. Instead Zawahiri focuses on trying to attack the ‘far enemy’ in hopes that they 
will be filled with fear and leave their area of control.  
In 2010 bin Laden wrote to Atiyatullah al-Libi that the purpose for “the purpose is 
for the mujahideen publications to be a good potential for the competition and to gain the 
crowds.”68 By this bin Laden emphasizes that the goal is to spread awareness amongst the 
people of the nation, and to keep and foster the support of their followers. As noted by 
Dr. Stout in his article, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb called for building bridges to the 
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people of Mali. This again reiterates the need and goal of awakening and educating the 
people.69  
Conclusion 
 It is evident that these jihadi strategists have had an impact on al-Qaeda’s post 
9/11 geostrategy. By dissecting the different literatures produced by the strategists it 
became evident that strategic culture impacted its geostrategy. Furthermore, due to al-
Qaeda’s decentralization and secretive nature, it is hard for al-Qaeda’s core to create a 
geostrategy and implement it at the various levels of the group. These jihad strategists 
help to fill this gap by writing about their life experiences and how al-Qaeda can establish 
an Islamic caliphate.  
 Additionally, one can postulate that the creation of geostrategy is inherently 
individualistic. Al-Qaeda’s geostrategy is an all-encompassing formation of the different 
literatures discussed above. While al-Qaeda core leader’s ideology, like Usama bin 
Laden’s, play a role, due to bin Laden isolation and the secretiveness of the organization 
it is hard to disseminate geostrategy to the entire organization, and therefore the creation 
of geostrategy becomes individualistic.  
 Furthermore, due to the individualism involved in creating geostrategy, one can 
trace al-Qaeda strategists’ geostrategies to certain actions and groups. With the strategists 
mentioned above, there is a correlation with different affiliate’s geostrategy. Each 
affiliate has a slightly different geostrategy that is exemplified by the differences between 







its individual; strategists. Therefore, understanding the jihad strategists’ literature is 
imperative to understanding al-Qaeda’s geostrategy.  
 The implications of understanding jihad strategist’s publications are that one can 
now conceptualize and understand how al-Qaeda forms its geostrategy. Additionally, one 
can comprehend the impact of its ideology as the main driver for its hatred towards the 
United States. Al-Qaeda has made great strides in understanding how the United States 
creates its strategy. Understanding how al-Qaeda creates its geostrategy helps us 
understand its motives, and how best to counter them. Moreover, while this subject has 
not been widely researched, with the recent declassification of Usama bin Laden’s 
bookshelf by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Harmony Project 
at the Counter Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, scholars will now be 








Chapter 2: Deciphering al-Qaeda’s Deterrence Strategy 
 
Introduction  
Deterrence conjures images of the Cold War and nuclear weapons. Rarely is 
deterrence connected with a violent non-state actor (VNSA) group. Most research on 
deterrence and VNSAs tend to focus on how state actors can deter a VNSA. Few, 
however, have examined the opposite—how VNSA might try to deter their state 
adversaries. In this chapter the author aims to determine whether al-Qaeda uses 
dissuasion by denial as a deterrence strategy. The author hypothesizes that al-Qaeda does 
use dissuasion by denial as their deterrence strategy.  
Al-Qaeda is a powerful group with vast influence in Near East and South Central 
Asia. It is unique because its leaders are highly educated and very rational and strategic 
thinkers. Part of its recruitment and training includes reading United States publications 
on strategy. Al-Qaeda’s leaders take pride in understanding how Americans think, and 
believe that we act in our own best interest to promote our power and influence in the 
international community.70 Deciphering whether al-Qaeda uses dissuasion by denial as a 
deterrence strategy is important because it gives insight into what means they use to try to 
deter them. 
This chapter determines whether al-Qaeda engages in dissuasion by deterrence 
(DND) by using two case studies. Deterrence theory at its basic level involves the use of 
threats to convince adversaries to refrain from taking particular actions by conveying to 
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them that the costs and risks of such actions outweigh the potential benefit.71  Dissuasion 
by denial, is a method used for “deterring an action by having the adversary see a 
credible capability to prevent him from achieving potential gains adequate to motive the 
action.”72 Using this theory the author hypothesizes that the group uses terrorism as a 
tactic to deter its adversaries.  
The proceeding section of my thesis discusses deterrence literature, specifically as 
it pertains to dissuasion by denial and different methods that al-Qaeda could use to try to 
deter their adversaries. The two cast studies used to determine wither al-Qaeda does use 
DND are al-Qaeda’s attempts to attain CBRN weapons and as the use of terrorist attacks 
to deter their adversaries.   
In the conclusion, an overview is given on whether al-Qaeda deters its 
adversaries, as well as a discussion on the implications of understanding al-Qaeda’s 
deterrence strategy. Knowing where al-Qaeda weaknesses lay can help the US deter 
future attacks.   
Literature Review 
The literature discussed in this section is on dissuasion by denial and argues that 
deterring an action by having the adversary see a credibly capability to prevent him from 
achieving potential gains adequate to motivate the action.”73  
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Dissuasion by Denial 
Since the end of the Cold War, deterrence strategy no longer only pertains to 
trying to deter WMDs. This is due to a number of contributing factors such as 
globalization and the increased capabilities of non-state actors. These changes have 
brought the international community into a new era of deterrence strategy in which 
deterrence is not just between nuclear states. Increased technologies give terrorist groups 
a greater capability to cause a much greater impact. With this said, even as deterrence 
strategy has morphed to include VNSA groups, commonalities still exist between 
traditional deterrence strategy and 21st century deterrence strategy, where deterrence is no 
longer relevant to solely states and based on nuclear weapons.  
Dissuasion was brought to the spotlight in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
where one of the defense strategies was to “dissuade other countries form initiating future 
military competitions.”74 Since then, the concept of dissuasion has been used in many 
subsequent documents and has evolved. Dissuasion by denial (DND) is “deterring an 
action by having the adversary see a credibly capability to prevent him from achieving 
potential gains adequate to motivate the action.”75 Notably the definition of DND 
emphasizes what the adversary “sees” and how they regard the capability as “credible.” 
These terms avoid basing the judgement of the actor on the rational-actor theory.76 
Additionally, DND does not stand alone and must incorporate elements of deterrence by 
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threat of punishment.77 This is the idea that if the adversary will be prevented from 
achieving its gains for fear or punishment or reprisal.  
An integral part of DND is the threat of punishment must be associated with an 
adversary’s noncompliance. In order for the threat to work, it must be credible. Having 
weapons and sufficient lethal capability is one way to attain this.78 This is further 
explained in Thomas Schelling’s idea of mutual deterrence. Another way to ensure threat 
of punishment is based on the adversary having fear, and understanding the costs 
associated with certain actions. Here is where the credibly of the threat is crucial. The 
adversary must believe that the deterrer has the credibility and intent to take action.  
Mutual deterrence is one way that deterrers try to deter an adversary by showing a 
credible capability equivalent to their own. Thomas C. Schelling is one of the leading 
scholars on deterrence strategy and argues this. Schelling believes that, “mutual 
deterrence is considered the more stable, the less susceptible it is to political and 
technological events, information and misinformation, accidents, alarms, and mischief 
that might upset it.”79 In order to keep the status quo, an adequate number of weapons 
and military capabilities must exist on both sides. Schelling also argues that military 
strategy is in fact a bargaining strategy since it involves the potential use of force more 
than the actual use of force.80  
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In order to effectively implement DND, the RAND study suggested that there are 
four main criteria that help the adversary overcome cognitive biases. The first is to 
dramatize in diplomacy and public statements the worst-case outcome if the adversary 
were to commit the action.81 The second is to dissuade the adversary by elevating the 
plausibility of good outcomes under other options. The third is to undercut the 
plausibility of the best-outcome scenario. One way to do this is by demonstrating resolve.  
The final criteria is to make the expected outcome more costly by increasing the 
likelihood of retaliation.82 Notably not all of these DND criteria’s may be fitting for all 
situations. For example, undercutting the best possible outcome may not be effective in 
certain situations. 
Coercive strategy also is a part of DND and involves the manipulation of an 
adversary by threatening retaliation if behavior is not adjusted. 83  In order for deterrence 
to work, however, one group needs to persuade the other that the status quo should be 
maintained. Notably, this would imply that for this to be effective, both actors would 
have to be of the same rationality. Additionally, even if they were of the same rationality, 
one actor could misread a sign and deterrence could fail.84 Terrorist organizations are 
rational actors. However, a state actor and a terrorist organization are not of the same 
rationality and therefore, coercive strategy could be difficult to employ.  
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Also noteworthy is that the theory deterrence by denial, aligns with DND. This 
theory is often used interchangeably with dissuasion by denial. Deterrence by denial is 
defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as persuading the enemy to not attack 
because they do not have a chance at winning, and will not be able to achieve its 
operational goals.85 Deterrence by denial is also not only limited to nuclear weapons. The 
theory applies to any capability that can deter an enemy from achieving its objectives.86 
This aligns with the DND definition provided by RAND.  
Other deterrence theories that are similar to dissuasion by deterrence are 
internalized deterrence and generalized deterrence. Internalized deterrence occurs when 
deterrence is not deliberately applied as a strategy, but succeeds because of self-induced 
fear of the consequences of the adversary if something were to happen. Conversely, 
generalized deterrence is, “an institutional perception by a state or group of states that, 
despite continuing antagonism, it should not expect to be able to resolve its disputes with 
another state or group of states by military means.”87 This implies that the state being 
deterred is willing to accept the vital interest of the deterrer and maintain the status-quo. 
The longer this acceptance lasts, the greater the stability of the situation.88 When political 
factors change, the stability can change as well. Because of this, deterrence is a norm and 
                                                 












the fear of consequences for a specific action is embedded. Before a state would have to 
repeatedly announce their desires to the challenger, but now this is no longer the case.89  
Finally, since this chapter aims to answer the question of whether al-Qaeda has a 
deterrence strategy, it is important to see how deterrence is defined in Arabic. There is 
very little literature on what deterrence means in Arabic and to Islamic extremists. 
Deterrence in Sunni Islamist writing uses the Arabic word rad’a. In regards to Sunni 
Islamists rad’a has two main meanings.90 The first is that it is used as a western concept 
of deterrence. This aligns with the use of force by one party to convince another party or 
refrain from taking a certain action. The second aligns with dissuasion by denial 
deterrence, where it brings the adversary to desist from actions that is it already taking or 
to rollback its action through threat of retaliation.91 
An operational doctrine written by Sheikh Munir al-Ghadban’s, who was the 
leader of the Shura Council in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, characterizes deterrence 
by defense against the enemy’s capability.92 This aligns with the dissuasion by denial 
definition. However, many Salafi jihadist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood believe 
that “it is not enough to respond to the enemy after an attack, but believes that deterrence 
through punishment is not credible unless the enemy has previously experienced Muslim 
force.”93 This falls under the category of pre-emptive deterrence.  
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Pre-emptive deterrence was added to the National Security Strategy after 
September 11, 2001. The concept states that when deterrence may fail and war may come 
with little warning, and therefore a pre-emptive action may be needed to avoid war. Pre-
emptive punishment is only used when one thinks that the enemy is going to stroke.94 
Preventive war involves military operations to avert a possible future risk. Pre-emptive 
punishment is a very controversial policy, which the U.S. used to go into Iraq in 2003. 
With this said, critics of pre-emptive punishment argue that there was no evidence that 
Saddam Hussein was about to attack the US or transfer WMDs to terrorists.95  
Theory  
Determining whether al-Qaeda has a deterrence strategy helps to understand al-
Qaeda’s defensive strategy and where it believes their enemies weaknesses lay. Knowing 
this allows them to be able to influence their enemy on a grander scale. Examining 
deterrence theory can help to give further insight into why al-Qaeda chooses certain 
courses of actions as part of their strategy. For example, its desire to obtain chemical 
weapons is to show a credible capability, while the execution of certain strategic terrorist 
attacks, like the Madrid bombing, are meant to show recourse for an action taken against 
the group. Furthermore, due to globalization the world is now more interconnected and 
traditional deterrence theory is not applicable to all situations. Non-state actors have an 
increasingly important role in the liberal world order. By evaluating how al-Qaeda deters 
its enemies, it allows better insight into the overarching strategy of the group.     
                                                 









 To analyze al-Qaeda’s dissuasion by denial deterrence strategy, two case studies 
are utilized. The first case study is al-Qaeda’s use of CBRN weapons and the second is 
al-Qaeda’s use of tactical strategy of terrorism to deter its adversary  
While conducting the case studies, congruence procedures, which is a process-
tracing methodology to analyze the information, were used.96 This was particularly useful 
because it allowed for the comparison of al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy to the literature 
findings. This also allowed the author to find the similarities and differences in al-
Qaeda’s deterrence strategy and state actors. There is also multiple within-case 
comparisons to show how al-Qaeda conducts each of the deterrence strategies.  
Data 
Use of CBRN 
 Since al-Qaeda’s inception the group has been trying to increase its power and 
capability to cause violence. Al-Qaeda’s desire to acquire CBRN weapons is directly 
related to this effort. Al-Qaeda is a unique group that has many scholars debating its 
rationality when it comes to the use of force. Some scholars believe that members of al-
Qaeda’s leadership are irrational actors, while some believe that they are rational. Other 
scholars focus more on how to make a credible threat of retaliation if al-Qaeda does use a 
weapon of mass destruction and are less concerned with the rationality of its leadership.97 
Al-Qaeda’s overall strategy of jihad is geared towards using religious justification for 
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political outcomes.98 The importance of this is that while al-Qaeda will act to promote 
jihad and the defense of Islam, there is also a sense of irrationality and unpredictability 
when it comes to al-Qaeda’s attacks.  
The late Usama bin Laden and current emir of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
goal is to build a caliphate that is powerful enough to withstand the West and its enemies. 
Al-Zawahiri in his book, the Knights Under the Banner Prophet, says “If the successful 
operation against Islam’s enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do not serve 
the ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they 
will be nothing more than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be 
absorbed and endured, even if after some time and with some losses.”99 Therefore, the 
use of force must be applied strategically in the best interest of the political outcome.100 
Moreover, in order for al-Qaeda to use CBRN weapons as a deterrent, it must be done so 
that supports the political outcome of promoting jihad and creating an Islamic caliphate. 
This was also emphasized in the two fatwas that were issued on weapons of mass 
destruction. In 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a fatwa that openly declared war on the 
United States and stated that it was his Islamic duty to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction.101 Bin Laden declared that the sins committed by the Americans are a clear 
declaration of war. While Bin Laden did not have the proper authority to issue this fatwa, 
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by doing this he became the public mastermind of al-Qaeda, and provided religious 
justification for causing mass casualties of Americans. This also helped to lay the 
religious groundwork for 9/11. In fact, after 9/11 al-Zawahiri said in reference to 9/11, 
“this was not just a human achievement – it was a holy act.”102 This fatwa became a top 
priority for Bin Laden’s lieutenants in the following years. 
 In 2003, Saudi Cleric Nasir Bin Hamd Al-Fadh issued a fatwa on the use of 
weapons of mass destruction. Al-Fadh justified the use of WMDs on two grounds. The 
first is on the principle of reciprocity. He argues that the US aggression towards Muslims 
have caused over 10 million deaths, and therefore the use of WMDs are justified.103 The 
second principle is that jihad supersedes all other considerations. Al-Fadh concludes the 
fatwa by saying that if using WMD is the only way to meet the jihad, then it is acceptable 
to use them, even if collateral damage is the case.104  
 The importance of the fatwas is that it laid the framework for al-Qaeda to be able 
to use and pursue WMDs. It was evident that its acquisition of CBRN was no longer 
intended for defensive purposes. Even though WMDs are outlawed under Islam, they 
were justified because they countered US hegemony. The fatwas also showed al-Qaeda 
commitment to attaining weapons of mass destruction because they would help to destroy 












the global status-quo and apostate regimes, and would create conditions which were more 
conducive for jihad.105   
Al-Qaeda’s quest to attain nuclear weapons is a testament to its ideology and 
overall strategy. Acquiring nuclear weapons would be the key tool in al-Qaeda’s arsenal 
because it would level the playing field with its state adversaries. It could serve as both a 
deterrent and an offensive tactic and would enhance the political posture of al-Qaeda 
because it would discourage intervention for fear of a nuclear weapon attack reprisal. In 
fact, Usama bin Laden said in an interview with a Pakistani journalist on November 7, 
2001, “I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, 
then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as a 
deterrent.”106 In fact, al-Qaeda efforts to attain weapons of mass destruction started off as 
a deterrent and defensive weapon for possible U.S. aggression within its area of 
operation, particularly in Afghanistan.107 This policy of using weapons of mass 
destruction as a deterrent quickly evolved to using WMDs as an offensive weapon.  
 Another contributing factor in al-Qaeda’s use of CBRN weapons is its 
dependence on the media. The more dramatic the event is, the more publicity they will 
receive and the more they can promote the call to jihad. Conversely, if they go too far in 
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the eyes of the public, they will receive backlash, which could hurt its mission and 
ideology. Therefore, Al-Qaeda strives to find the balance of physical and psychological 
coercion.108 This tactic can be traced back to the 19th century anarchist’s notion of 
propaganda par le fait in which revolutionaries employed symbolic violence to incite 
revolution.109  
Trying to develop CBRN weapons has been important to al-Qaeda since the 
inception of the group. Since the early 1990’s al-Qaeda core has kept the procurement of 
CBRN weapons at a very close hold away from lower levels of the organization.110 In the 
acquisition of CBRN al-Qaeda facilitates the top-down approach. Interestingly al-Qaeda 
has never carried out a nuclear or biological attack. Instead, al-Qaeda has acquired 
chemical weapons and explosive technology and carried out only a handful of chemical 
weapons attacks.111 The first chemical weapons attack facilitated by al-Qaeda was in 
1993 when the group detonated a car bomb filled with cyanide gas at the World Trade 
Center, killing five people.112 Subsequent chemical weapons attacks have been dispersed 
all across the world, although primarily in the Middle East and Europe. In 1993 to early 
1994 al-Qaeda tried to acquire uranium in Sudan for a nuclear device. In 1999-2001 al-
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Qaeda created training camps led by Abu Khabab al-Masri, who was a chemist and 
bomb-maker as well as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who was a leading al-Qaeda strategist.113 In 
these camps they also trained members about CBRN. It was said that these courses 
covered chemical, biological, and radiological basic training courses for hundreds of 
extremists.114 
One notable chemical attack carried out by al-Qaeda in the early 2000s is the 
attack in a residential housing compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On November 8, 2003 
near the city of Riyadh, perpetrators launched an armed intrusion and denominated 3 
bombs. It is believed that al-Qaeda administered the attack, but it is not officially 
confirmed. There were 17 fatalities and 122 injured.115  
Furthermore, there were several failed attempts of al-Qaeda using chemical 
weapons. In June 2002, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who was the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
conducted crude chemical and biological training and experiments in a remote area in 
northeast Iraq.116 In 2003, al-Zarqawi and his affiliates in London tried to use ricin and 
cyanide in the London Underground.  In April 2004, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) tried to 
detonate several trucks filled with chemical explosives in Jordan outside of the General 
Intelligence Department (GID). If successfully detonated, fatalities could have reached 
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20,000 people.117 After the attacks there were protests and media backlash, which caused 
al-Zarqawi (the leader of AQI at the time) to denounce the attacks as AQIs.118 In 2002 
videos surfaced showing al-Qaeda experimenting with chemical weapons (CW) at its 
Darunta camp near Jalalabad in Afghanistan. The gas featured in the video was expected 
to be sarin. There were formulas of sarin found at the camp.119 
In March to May 2003, al-Qaeda senior operative Abu Bakr was in 
communication with an Iran-based al-Qaeda senior leader to try and purchase three 
purported “Russian nuclear devices.”120 There is no indication that al-Qaeda acquired 
these nuclear devices.   
It is suspected that in 2007 al-Qaeda in Iraq launched more than a dozen chlorine 
suicide bomb attacks in Baghdad, which killed 32 people and poisoned over 600 Iraqis.121 
It is also suspected that AQI carried out these attacks, even though AQI denied the 
involvements.122 The targets of the attacks were Sunni Muslims and former insurgents to 
the Islamic Army in Iraq. AQI did admit to the downing of a Marine CH-46 transport 
helicopter in Karma, which was also where a chlorine bomb factory was discovered in 
February 21, 2007.123  
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More recently in 2013 the Iraqi military arrested five al-Qaeda cell members that 
were seeking to manufacture chemical weapons, including sarin nerve gas. It is believed 
that they were plotting attacks in Iraq, Europe, and North America.124 The cell was 
seeking to produce sarin as well as distilled mustard, which is a blistering agent. Notably 
the group had acquired some of the precursors need to develop CW. In the same report, it 
was also mentioned that the al Nusrah Front for the People in the Levant, which is al-
Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, had acquired sarin gas.   
Use of Terrorist Attacks 
 Jihad theorists and al-Qaeda members argue that terrorism can be used as a means 
of deterrence. The main proponents of this theory are Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Bakr 
Naji. Both have dedicated sections of their books on how to deter the enemy.  
 Abu Mus’ab al-Suri is label one of the most important strategists and theorist of 
al-Qaeda. In al-Suri’s book The Global Islamic Resistance Call, he addresses the strategy 
of deterrence with terrorism. The theory behind using terrorism as a deterrent is that the 
attack will instill enough fear into the enemy that they will not want to engage with al-
Qaeda. In his book he says, “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of 
your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of 
Allah, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the case of Allah, shall be 
repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly. (Al-Anfal 8:60).125 This provides the 
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religious justification for the attacks. Furthermore, al-Suri emphasizes that it is the duty 
of the jihad movement to deter those who inflict harm on Muslims.126  One of the most 
important passages on al-Suri’s deterrence theory is when he says,  
Generally, most of our enemies, the supporters of the American invasion, 
and especially the apostates, the agents, the hypocrites, the corrupted, and 
those bragging about their so-called culture and development are a group of 
cowardly rats, starting from the biggest of their kings, presidents, and 
princes, and to the smallest of their writers, their media figures and their 
sycophants with all their fantasies…Most of them will be deterred if one 
sets an example by striking or severely punishing a few of them. Then, 
most of them will withdraw from confrontation.127 
Here is the heart of al-Qaeda’s deterrence theory of using terrorism as a means to deter 
the US. Al-Qaeda believes that terrorist attacks can instill fear into the population and 
cause the public to want to withdraw from the region. Then, al-Qaeda can institute the 
Islamic caliphate and promote jihad.   
Abu Bakr Naji also wrote about deterrence strategy in his book The Management 
of Savagery. As mentioned in the previous chapter, The Management of Savagery is 
aimed at creating a caliphate by using the technique of vexation and exhaustion to 
overthrow every government and make them subscribe to shariah law. 128 During this 
process, the nation will enter into a state of savagery. While in the state of savagery Naji 
believes that some groups of vexation will unite into a single entity in order to manage 
different regions of savagery. This is important because the group must balance between 
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concentrating in one place so enemies will be deterred from encroachment, while also 
simultaneously trying to expand its territory and influence.  
Additionally, during the administration of savagery Naji describes how the enemy 
will “pay the price.”129 He extensively goes into this strategy and argues that during the 
administration of savagery, the enemy will be deterred and be made to think “one 
thousand times” before attacking regions managed by a regime of the administration of 
savagery.130 Naji outlines this by saying, “it is best if those that undertake operations of 
‘paying the price’ are other groups in the regions against which no hostility has been 
directed…Among the most important benefits is making the enemy feel that he is 
surrounded and that his affairs are exposed. If the enemy undertakes a hostile action 
against a region in the Arabian Peninsula or in Iraq, then the response will occur in 
Morocco or Niger or Indonesia.”131 This is to show the areas in which the groups have 
influence and demonstrate that there is no good arena for the enemy to respond. Where 
the enemy does initially receive the hostility, the administration will work to raise the 
morale in that area and communicate to all Muslims that assistance is not limited by 
borders.132 
 The epitome of using terrorism as a deterrent was the bombing in Madrid, Spain 
on March 11, 2004, which was also three days before the Spanish general election. The 
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well-orchestrated bombings in the commuter train killed 191 people.133 The al-Qaeda 
member linked to the attack was Amer Azizi, who was a Moroccan who lived in Madrid 
for a decade, and left Spain in 2001 to join al-Qaeda. Notably, Azizi was a part of the 
Abu Dahdah cell which was established by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri in the mid-1990s. Azizi 
worked closely with al-Qaeda core senior leadership to orchestrate the attack.  
 Al-Suri also addresses the Madrid bombing in his book the Global Islamic 
Resistance Call. He explains how the bombing was a successful deterrent operation and 
there were three major outcomes. The first was that it changed public opinion in Spain. 
Polls showed that three days before the Parliamentary election the right-wing party, who 
allied with Bush and sent 2,000 troops to Iraq, was favored.134 After the bombing, the 
Socialist Party, who promised to withdraw troops, won the election. The second was that 
Spain did in fact withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq. The third was that the entire 
European-American alliance was shaken and countries started debating withdrawal from 
the region.135  
 Another example of al-Qaeda successfully using a terrorist attack to deter their 
enemy and have them leave their territory was in October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. 
Two U.S. helicopter special operations forces were shot down by Somalis who were 
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reportedly trained by al-Qaeda.136 It resulted in the death of eighteen Americans and the 
attack led to the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.  
Analysis 
This section looks at the findings from the case studies and compare how al-
Qaeda’s strategy to acquire CBRN and uses terrorism attacks aligns dissuasion by denial. 
After, the two case studies are compared and one can identify where al-Qaeda’s strengths 
and weaknesses lie.  
Use of CBRN 
 Al-Qaeda’s desire to acquire CBRN weapons is directly related to its desire to 
attain power and influence and to attain and credible capability. The data has also shown 
however, that al-Qaeda tries to obtain CBRN for offensive purposes and not as a strategic 
deterrent. In order for DND to work, there must be a credible capability that will prevent 
the adversary from attacking, or there must be fear of reprisal. The acquisition of CBRN 
could be used as a credible capability. However, from the examples given in the data 
section, al-Qaeda does not use CBRN for DND purposes. Instead, the data shows that al-
Qaeda cautiously uses CBRN for offensive purposes.  
As mentioned previously, Usama bin Laden said in 1998 that al-Qaeda was 
acquiring CBRN technologies to act as a deterrent, although, the fatwa issued by al-Fadh 
in 2003 proves to contradict this statement. In the fatwa, the use of these weapons could 
be for offensive purposes, not just for deterrence purposes. The justification given for 
using weapons of mass destruction is due to the need for reciprocity of millions of 








Muslim deaths at the hands of the West as well as the belief that jihad supersedes all 
other considerations. If the use of these weapons would support jihad, then it is 
justifiable, no matter the collateral damage. Al-Fadh and his fatwa accept the reprisal of 
the attack, if the attack serves a higher interest. The two fatwas issued also change al-
Qaeda’s strategy of attaining WMDs for deterrence purposes to offensive purposes.  
 The data on al-Qaeda’s pursuit of chemical and biological weapons (CW, BW) 
also supports that al-Qaeda uses the weapons for offensive attacks and not as a deterrent.  
All of the above examples of al-Qaeda’s CBRN were for offensive purposes. 
Furthermore, when AQI tried to deploy a chemical attack on the Jordanian General 
Intelligence Department, it received considerable backlash from the populace. This was 
cause for concern for AQI, and ended with al-Zarqawi denouncing the attack due to bad 
press.137 CBRN weapons are stigmatized by the international community, which does not 
tolerate them. If al-Qaeda were to use these weapons, they would receive backlash from 
the media, which could hurt its call to jihad. This is why al-Qaeda tends to favor using 
explosives and bombings instead of CBRN weapons. There is also a stigma associated 
with these weapons because of its inhumanness.    
There is a technical and monetary aspect which is associated with CBRN weapons 
that is important to address. CBRN weapons are more expensive and take scientists and 
specialists to create the weapon. Explosives are less expensive and easier to manufacture; 
therefore, they are a better weapon to use than CBRN. This contributes to the fact that 
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there have been no nuclear, radiological or biological attacks, and only a handful of 
chemical attacks by al-Qaeda.  In fact, the most common chemical weapon used by al-
Qaeda is chlorine, and this is because it is fairly abundant and commonly used for 
industrial purposes.138 Additionally, in recent years the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and Biological Weapons Convention have strengthened, which has made it harder for 
VNSAs to attain chemical and biological weapons. Therefore, there is a risk associated 
with using CBRN, especially if the attacks could be linked backed to al-Qaeda, they 
could lose legitimacy. Using methods of violence that are vehemently opposed by most 
of the population could end up hurting the group.  
Moreover, al-Qaeda would most likely never be able to acquire enough CBRN 
weapons to serve as a mutual deterrent against the West, especially with the technical 
aspects as well as monetary mentioned above. In the end game, al-Qaeda does not have 
nuclear weapons, and its CW and BW weapons are restricted. Therefore, the purpose of 
these attacks would be offensive or to express disapproval of an act by an adversary.   
Use of Terrorist Attacks 
 Al-Qaeda has used terrorism as a dissuasion by denial deterrence strategy, but has 
only had limited success. The example of the Madrid bombing supports this assertion. 
The goal as mentioned by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji is that the adversary’s 
population will be so overcome with fear by the attack that they will not want to engage 
with al-Qaeda anymore for fear of future attacks. Al-Qaeda will continue to test its 
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adversary’s boundaries to see the type of reaction it receives. However, as shown, the 
success of using terrorist attacks as a deterrent is very limited. Additionally, terrorist 
attacks have a very low success rate, making them an inefficient tool for deterrence. 
 Internalized deterrence also aligns al-Qaeda uses terrorist attacks as a deterrence 
strategy.  Internalized deterrence, which is when an action is carried out that 
consequently deters the enemy, has the most applicability because a terrorist attack is 
administered for a variety of reasons, not just to deter the enemy. For example, a terrorist 
attack could be in protest to an action that the adversary took, but the fear associated from 
the attack happened to deter the adversary from repeating that same action. This is 
particularly applicable to lone wolves because their motive is to show allegiance to jihad 
and discontent towards the status quo.  
Furthermore, after a terrorist attack the enemy may be less likely to further agitate 
the aggressor for fear of a repeated incident. Al-Qaeda was able to deter and influence 
Spain from keeping its troops in Iraq by bombing the subway system in Madrid three 
days before the election. The attack was carefully and administered immediately before 
the general election where the two competing parties were in close competition. Its 
success is mostly due to the timeliness of the attack and the state of the nation at the time.  
Another prevalent deterrence trend found in jihad literature is the purpose of the 
attack is twofold. The first purpose is that the attacks are intended to cause fear, so that 
they can promote its ideology and show its disdain for the West. The second is to force 
the West to withdraw from its territory. Al-Qaeda knows the territory, and its customs 






during the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq a picture surfaced of American 
soldiers mutilating Iraqi bodies. This caused outrage in the international community and 
turned the populace against the Americans, which worked in favor of al-Qaeda and 
strengthened its ideology.139  
As Usama bin Laden argued, the goal of Jihad is to build a caliphate strong to 
stand up to the west and protect Muslims. Importantly, there were times, especially at the 
birth of al-Qaeda where they wanted encroachment on its territory, so that they could turn 
the population against the evil west and enlighten them to jihad. Now that al-Qaeda is in 
the spotlight, an attack that is too brutal can deter people from joining the group. Ayman 
al-Zawahiri wrote a letter to al-Zarqawi urging him against the use of brutal force on the 
population because it could in fact hurt the cause of jihad.140 
Strengths and Weaknesses of al-Qaeda’s Deterrence Strategy 
 Al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy as a whole focuses on using strategic measures to 
change its adversary’s actions. This is shown by its efforts to gain legitimacy and power 
by obtaining CBRN weapons, and using a deterrence strategy focused on influencing the 
citizens of the west through terrorist attacks. In order for its deterrence strategy to work, 
it has to strike a balance between instilling fear and showing its superiority, while not 
antagonizing the enemy to take action. If the population is moved against al-Qaeda and 
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does not want to spend any more resources or lose lives to combat it, then al-Qaeda will 
be able to grow in its territory and eventually be a standing power against the west.  
The main strength of al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy is that it is versatile. While 
al-Qaeda’s attempts to obtain CBRN weapons are of great concern for the west, they 
promote their posture within its region. Groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) would greatly benefit from this capability since they control territory in Yemen 
and are of the same rationality as other actors in the region. Using terrorist attacks as a 
means of deterrence is also a strength because it serves as two means to support Jihad. 
The first is that it instills fear into al-Qaeda’s enemies and the second is that it has the 
ability to alter democracies decisions. Additionally, suicide bombings also wear on 
democratic countries because people are overcome by the act of suicide and the casualties 
associated with it.  
The weakness associated with al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy is that its pursuance 
of CBRN weapons would not deter a state adversary, especially because the two are not 
of the same rationality. Al-Qaeda has also proven itself to act irrationally, and a state 
would not trust al-Qaeda not to use the weapons. Furthermore, it is very difficult to attain 
CBRN technologies, which require sufficient funds and specialized knowledge. Al-Qaeda 
is also susceptible to the media and if it were to use CBRN it could receive backlash that 
could hurt its credibility, which happened during the failed attempted to attack the 
Jordanian General Intelligence Department.   
Conclusion 
 The implication for understanding al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy is that it helps to 






Qaeda is afraid of. Understanding this can help the US develop a more effective 
counterterrorism and deterrence strategy towards al-Qaeda. There are also implications 
for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since it morphed from al-Qaeda’s AQI, and 
uses some of the same ideological platforms for justification of violence. 
 Al-Qaeda has shown that they are willing and have the religious justification to 
use CBRN weapons for offensive purposes against the west.  However, instead of heavily 
investing in developing CBRN technology and weapons, al-Qaeda has used explosives 
more since they are cheaper and more abundant. Al-Qaeda has also used terrorist attacks 
as a means to deter its enemy and change political outcomes, as this was seen in the case 
of Spain.  
If al-Qaeda were to successfully use the CBRN as a deterrent, its adversary would 
most likely have to be an actor without same level of capabilities. This superiority could 
also be used as coercive diplomacy. Al-Qaeda could promote its ideology and territory by 
using the fear of reprisal if a group were to infringe on its territory. Its goal is to create an 
Islamic caliphate and instill Islamic sharia law. If al-Qaeda were to successfully acquire 
CBRN weapons, this would escalate its bargaining position in the international 
community.  
 One striking fear that plagues al-Qaeda’s leadership is the media. While the media 
serves as a platform for promoting al-Qaeda’s ideology, it can also hurt al-Qaeda’s image 
because it broadcasts the atrocities associated with al-Qaeda’s attacks. This can turn the 
people against al-Qaeda. When the plane flew into the twin towers on September 11, 






the media. They wanted to strike fear into the west and ignite a movement within 
Muslims to join the Jihad. Now that they have the attention of the media, they have to 
balance its attacks or people will be deterred from joining al-Qaeda. For example, the use 
of biological and chemical weapons is stigmatized, outraging the public. Therefore, if al-
Qaeda were to use such weapons, it would have to be in a dire situation or a situation in 
which the impact of the attack would outweigh the backlash. This could explain why al-
Qaeda sometimes waits to claim attacks until the initial shock is over. 
 After analyzing how al-Qaeda conducts its deterrence strategy and addressing its 
fear of the media, it is important to also address the implications for the United States. 
The first is that it is very unlikely that al-Qaeda will be a CBRN threat. However, even if 
al-Qaeda were to acquire enough of the weapon, al-Qaeda and the US are of a different 
rationality and the US would not trust al-Qaeda not to use the weapons. Therefore, the 
acquisition of CBRN would not be a strong deterrent for the United States. Terrorist 
attacks, on the other hand, carry more weight. This is because of the mental toll that it 
takes on the American population. It is also very hard to predict and prevent terrorist 












The goal of many violent Salafi Jihadist groups is to establish an Islamic 
Caliphate within its area of operation. This caliphate would essentially be a state in which 
the organization executed governance over its people and established a strict form of 
Sharia Law. Groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have 
taken measures to create strategies to make its aspiration of an Islamic caliphate a reality. 
ISIS declared themselves a caliphate in 2014. ISIS’s core has also had success in holding 
territory and establishing governance in two primary areas: Mosul, Iraq and Ar Raqqa, 
Syria. In terms of al-Qaeda, its affiliate in Yemen al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) has had the most success in trying to establish territory and governance over its 
people. This chapter addresses whether it is plausible for a violent Salafi extremist group 
to achieve its goal of establishing a state in an era of globalization.  
In this chapter looks at literature about what makes up a state and examine what is 
needed to successfully build an Islamic state. Most of the literature applies to what is 
needed to build a Western state. The reasoning behind this is because in the regions that 
these groups operate, they are not resource self-sufficient. They therefore would need to 
trade with work with other nations in order to get the commodities needed to prosper. 
Western nations would not want to trade with an illegitimate state. Additionally, the 
author researches literature about characteristics of a state especially as it pertains to 
political Islam in the globalization era. Importantly, my literature review serves as a 






To determine if it is plausible for a Salafi Islamic group to build a caliphate, two 
case studies are used. The first case study is ISIS and the second is AQAP. The two 
groups were chosen because both have been successful in attaining territory and instilling 
a pseudo-government. Both have also had varying degrees of success in controlling 
territory and exerting its influence over the populace.  
The analysis section looks at the group’s strengths and weaknesses. After the 
analysis, it is determined whether the groups have succeeded in building a State based on 
the conditions set in the literature review. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
how plausible it is for a Salafi Jihad group to build a caliphate given the characteristics 
needed for state.  
Literature Review  
The modern sovereign state was created as a result of the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648.141 As nationalist movements swept across the continent during the late 18th century 
and early 19th century, nation-states began to develop.142 A state’s framework is 
comprised of sovereignty, a political unit, and territory.143 The literature review looks at 
these three aspects of a state as it applies to political Islam in this literature review.  
Sovereignty  
One of the foremost leadings scholars in political philosophy is Thomas Hobbes. 
Hobbes was a scholar during the 1600s and wrote his infamous Leviathan in 1651. Of 
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particular importance to this chapter, Hobbes described the ways in which a state can 
acquire sovereignty and maintain sovereignty over the people. Although first, a 
commonwealth must be formed where the people obey a common authority. This 
common authority is referred to by Hobbes as the Leviathan.144 This sovereign, which 
may be an individual or group, is then granted power by the people and has the 
responsibility to do whatever is necessary to defend the commonwealth. Commonwealths 
may be formed in two ways according to Hobbes, through institution or agreement, and 
through acquisition or force.145 Both ways are equal in establishing a commonwealth. A 
commonwealth by acquisition is of particular relevance to this chapter because both 
AQAP and ISIS have created a commonwealth by force. By using force, the people who 
are subject to the sovereign obey the sovereign for fear of death or other retribution 
factors.146  
Since the Hobbes era, globalization has occurred and many scholars argue that 
Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty is not as applicable to the present day. In Sovereignty and 
Territorial Borders in a Global Age, the author argues that globalization has made 
sovereignty evolve.147 Inviolable sovereignty has rarely, if ever, existed, and as a result of 
globalization there is an increased tie between polity and the state. Because of this there 
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is an argument present in the academic community that territory is becoming less 
important in an increasingly borderless world.148  
Moreover, due to globalization, there has been an increased emphasis on 
multilateralism and trans-border flows. This is usually equated with a decline in 
sovereign power; however, in the current era “sovereign states self-limit their sovereignty 
by accepting constraints on their actions in order to gain certain benefits from inclusion in 
international regimes or organizations.”149 The importance of this is that while states do 
not have to engage in globalization, for many reasons including economic prosperity, it is 
in its best interest to engage in globalization. 
Other authors argue that sovereignty can now be broken down into four distinct 
types: Westphalian, domestic, interdependence, and international legal.150 Westphalian 
sovereignty limits the involvement of foreign actors within a state. Interdependence refers 
to the control of trans-border movement and international legal refers to the factors that 
involve mutual recognition of states within the nation-state system.151 Krasner notes that 
when it comes to the Westphalian and international legal types, sovereignty deals 
exclusively with authority; whereas interdependence sovereignty deals exclusively with 
control and domestic sovereignty encompasses both.152  
Political Unit 
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One characterization of a state suggests that there is an identification between the 
people and the governing body that rules them.153 Included in this is the right to self-
determination, which scholars argue as being derived from the ideal of a nation-state,154 
Self-determination is the representation that the people can determine their political 
status, as well as freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.155 The 
idea of self-determination is particularly important to democratic societies.  Although 
self-determination has led to conflict, it is particularly important to democratic societies. 
The conflict caused by self-determination is because of competing identities of the 
populace and disputes between different groups who identify differently.156 This relates 
to the Middle East because of its diverse ethnicities who identify contrarily from one 
another.157  
The articles goes on to argue that conflict between the different identities is the 
essence of nation building, which he defines as “the process by which elites and counter-
elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and 
meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, 
and to compete with other groups.”158 Soltan notes that conflict and contention between 
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the different identities hinder any possible national consensus in the regions country. 
Therefore, the territorial state becomes the arena where traditional entities and identities 
interact.159  
In the Middle East, as states began to form, different identities began to identify 
with the state, and even those identities who did not identify with a state, were forced to 
acclimate and live within the state setting. However, territory in itself is not enough for a 
group to be recognized as a state. In fact, the importance of territory was initiated by the 
European colonial powers.160 The legitimacy of the territory state in the Arab World is 
considerably measured by the state’s commitment to serving interests that are in a larger 
scope than the interests of the territorial state.161 Soltan goes on to say, “The relationships 
among these types of identities are not static by any means. Large segments of Middle 
Eastern societies keep oscillating among different types of identities; the problem with 
such oscillation stems from the impact it has on the legitimacy, political, and regional 
stability of Arab states.”162  
Tamara Cofman Wittes of the Brookings Institution and other colleagues argue 
that there are three models of dominance in the Middle East today.163 The first is fragile 
democracy, as seen in Tunisia. The second order is the order through savagery, like ISIS 
and its brute force domination. The third model is renewed authoritarianism, as 
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experienced in Egypt under Sisi. The authors argue that the latter two of these models do 
not offer a stable or successful path for Middle Eastern states. Currently in the Middle 
East it seems that extremism and authoritarianism compete as alternative models for Arab 
governance.  
Governance is particularly important for a successful state and the report lays out 
four essential criteria to make governance more stable in the Arab world, and represents a 
consensus view of the field. The first point is that governance must be inclusive. 
Excluding ethnic minorities or women from society marginalizes too much of the 
population.164 Half of the population in the Middle East is under thirty years of age, and 
half of women in the area are marginalized.165 Therefore, when governance is by majority 
of older male elites, the authors argue that it is a recipe for grievance and instability.  
The second criteria for durable governance is that it must be transparent. 
Government opacity creates suspicion and exacerbates problems of authority.166 A 
sustainable government needs to listen to public demand and be accountable. A durable 
government opens itself up to public scrutiny and input. This aligns with the third criteria, 
which is that in order to have durable governance it must be effective. Over the past few 
decades in the Middle East there has been a stagnation and decline of the state 
institution’s effectiveness. It is seen as being top-heavy and mired with corruption and 
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bureaucracy.167 The final criteria is that governments needs to be accountable because 
governments should be sensitive to public opinion. 
To have good governance, there must be respect for the equality of all citizens. 
This is especially the case for exclusive governments and governments that use violence 
as a means to control the populace.168 Promoting equality for all citizens and having an 
inclusive government can be used to counter the resurgence of violence in societies 
emerging from conflict. Inclusive politics has also been shown to be a central foundation 
for economic success. In terms of the Middle East, “popular grievances in the Arab world 
before 2011 resulted not just from material deprivation or conflicts over resource 
allocation, but from the exclusionary and partisan manner in which government decision-
making occurred and still occurs in many places.”169 Because of this, citizen’s 
expectations shifted fundamentally and governments were left to catch up to the new 
social reality. Chants by the Arab Spring protestors included the need for, “bread, 
freedom, and social justice.”170 
Territory 
Also of significance in establishing a state is military might.171 An important 
application of military is that it is a basic variable in measuring state power, and can be 
used to take and secure territory.172 Of equal importance is the implication of military 
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effectiveness in defense planning.173 Military effectiveness focuses on the tactical and 
operation level activities and their success. A state can have robust military capabilities 
and still be ineffective because the weapons that they possess are ill-suited for the kinds 
of war they are likely to fight.174 Therefore, it is imperative that the state strike a balance 
between having enough resources to protect their boundaries and fight against 
adversaries, while also not overstretching their resources. In fact, some scholars argue 
that military effectiveness is directly correlated to four dimensions: political, strategic, 
operational, and tactical ability.175 An effective military integrates these four dimensions, 
with an awareness of each of the present constraints.  
The German sociologist Max Weber wrote that, “a state cannot be defined in 
terms of its ends, but rather in terms of the specific means peculiar to it. The state is a 
human community that (successfully) claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory.”176 Once the government has control over its instruments of 
violence, it further uses them to provide law and order, build up the state, oppress its own 
people, and engage in policies of aggrandizement.177 Ahmed Hashim wrote an article that 
discussed military power and state formation in postmodern Iraq. He argues that Iraqi 
rulers have misused violence against their own people as well as others. This misused 
violence led to weakened state security and intervention by other states. 
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In Hashim’s article he uses the security-sector reform (SSR) as his conceptual 
framework to analyze the relationship between military power and security and state 
formation.178 Notably, Hashim observes that over the past decade, security sectors around 
the globe have undergone vast transformations and resulted in the promotion of economic 
development and progress by lessening the burden of the military sector and 
implementing good governance and democratization through the demilitarization of 
society.179  
Hashim also examines that while the military power and security has declined 
over the past decade, there are still war fighting capabilities that are needed to wage a war 
effectively.180 One of these is having stable civil-military relations.181 An example 
provided in the article is that if civil-military relations are unstable, the military could 
intervene in the political process and will instead focus on politics and not military 
strength.182  
The literature on the characteristics of a state is split into three separate features – 
sovereignty, political unit, and territory. These characteristics go back to the Peace of 
Westphalia that was created by western states in 1648 and set the foundation of 
statehood. Non-state actors such ISIS and AQAP are trying to create a state. Due to 
globalization and the increased interdependence of nations, the meaning of statehood is 
changing. For example, some scholars argue that territory is becoming less important, 
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while others argue that military might and territorial boundaries are critical in attaining 
and sustaining/building/etc a state. Since ISIS has expanded its territory and taken major 
cities in Iraq and Syria it has received a lot of attention about whether it has formed a 
state. Not as much has been written on AQAP and its status on attaining an Islamic State. 
This chapter will expand on whether ISIS and AQAP have created an Islamic State and if 
they have not, whether it is plausible for them to do so. 
Theory  
This chapter evaluates the research question of whether it is plausible for a Salafi 
Islamist group to succeed in building an Islamic State by comparing the characteristics of 
a state to ISIS and AQAP. As mentioned previously, the goal of Salafi Jihadist groups is 
to build an Islamic Caliphate that enforces sharia law. A Caliphate can be described as “a 
state that is established under the sovereignty of Allah, and will do Allah’s will by 
working within the limits prescribed by Him in accordance with His instructions and 
injunctions.”183 The Caliphate is also described by an Islamic fundamentalist as, “the 
political system of Islam is based on three principles: Tawhid (unity of God/Allah), 
Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Viceregency).184 These three principles define the 
Caliphate and very much resemble a state. Therefore, using the characterizations of a 
state as my theory will allow me to evaluate my two case studies – ISIS and AQAP – and 
determine whether the groups can form a state. The literature review on characterization 
of a state provides a framework for what is needed to build a successful state.   
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 For my methods section, two case studies were chosen to determine whether it 
was plausible for a Salafist Jihad group to establish a Caliphate as a traditional state. The 
first case chosen was ISIS. ISIS is a unique terrorist organization because soon after its 
formal founding, they declared themselves a caliphate in 2014. Al-Qaeda core leadership, 
especially during the Usama bin Laden (UBL) era, was very careful to not declare a 
Caliphate until it was powerful enough and legitimate. ISIS announced its existence and 
immediately started taking over territory and declared its Caliphate. Because of this, and 
the fact that they hold territory, and instill governance over the population within its 
territory they are used as a case study. 
 The second case study chosen to research was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). This affiliate group of al-Qaeda has been one of the strongest affiliates and has 
also been able to hold territory and establish governance in Southern and Central Yemen. 
Because of the current civil war in Yemen, AQAP has been able to reap the benefits of 
more secured territories and safe havens. Recently AQAP has been able to stay below the 
radar due to Syria’s ongoing civil war as well as ISIS’ presence in both Syria and Iraq. 
An article in the Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel in 2015 stated that AQAP was the 
greatest direct threat to the United States and is still growing stronger.185  
 By looking at the Data on ISIS and AQAP and comparing it to the literature found 
on the main characteristics of a state, the author is able to discern whether ISIS and 
AQAP have succeeded in building a state, and if they have not whether it is possible for 
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them too. Both groups will have to have sovereignty, an established political unit, and 




ISIS had its origins from a militant group birthed from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 
2000 called Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ).186 When Zarqawi failed to get enough 
support for his group he travelled to Afghanistan to fight with the Soviet resistance. In 
Afghanistan, he was charged with running an Islamic militant training camp near 
Herat.187 It was not until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that Zarqawi moved into Iraq 
where he developed extensive ties with Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Islamic group. In 2003, 
during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi saw the opportunity to launch the Sunni 
minority insurgency after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The insurgency comprised of five 
different groups, including JTJ. In late 2004, Zarqawi brought his group under the loose 
control of UBL, and was rebranded as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).188  
AQI’s ideology was solidified in 2005 in the groups “creed and methodology,” 
where the group expressed its determination to promote and defend tawhid 
(monotheism), which is defined by the group as anyone who did not believe in the 
oneness of God was an infidel and subject to takfir (excommunication and death). The 
overarching goals of the group were to, “remove the aggressor from Iraq; affirm tawhid, 
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propagate the message that there is no god but God to all the countries in which Islam is 
absent; wage jihad to liberate Muslim territories from infidels and apostates; establish a 
wise caliphate, in which the sharia rules supreme, as it did during the Prophet 
Mohammad.”189 This ideology and goals directly aligned with al-Qaeda core goals and 
ideology. 
In 2005 a letter was intercepted from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Zarqawi which stated 
that he was displeased and urged caution about the use of brutality and aggression by 
AQI. Zawahiri expressed that jihadists cannot win without the hearts and minds of the 
Sunni masses.190 In 2006 AQI created the Mujahideen Shura Council in an attempt to 
unify different Sunni insurgencies in Iraq. Later that year on June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was 
killed by the U.S. military. The leadership fell under Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who 
announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This declaration was a 
failure as the group did not have enough resources and by 2008 the group was apparently 
defeated. 
 In 2009 as U.S. force began pulling out of cities in Iraq, ISI began attempts to 
sabotage Iraqi government infrastructure and attacks on civilians. On April 10, 2010, Abu 
Ayu al-Masri and Aby Umar Abudllah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi were both killed in a joint 
U.S.-Iraqi raid. 80% of the group’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured, with only 8 
remaining at large.191 From 2010-2013, ISI began or reemerged due to numerous events: 
the death of UBL and the fading leadership of new al-Qaeda emir Zawahiri, the outbreak 
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of the Syrian civil war, and the growing tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of ISI and transformed the organization into the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.  
Sovereignty 
 Reports have shown that laws under ISIS territory can be strict and oppressive.192 
ISIS is devoted to restoring the purest form of Islam as was practiced under the Prophet 
Mohammed during the 7th century. When ISIS started to take territory in 2013-2014 
much of the Sunni population welcomed them because of improved infrastructure and 
living conditions that ISIS offered.193 This is especially true in Mosul where many Sunnis 
felt marginalized by the Shias.194 One civilian said, “ISIS with all its brutality is more 
honest and merciful than the Shia government in Baghdad and its militias.”195 When ISIS 
took Mosul, the city’s population was estimated at 1.7 million, as many as 500,000 
people fled, but the others remained because of family ties or because they wanted to take 
their chance with ISIS.196 In the case of Syria, civilians faced a repressive dictatorship. 
Therefore, the alternate regimes in both Syria and Iraq were not much better than ISIS, 
and in some areas, they were worse. However, as living conditions have started to 
deteriorate in ISIS held territory, citizens are becoming wary of the group and its harsh 
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forms of punishment.197 In some regions, the price of gasoline has gone up to as much as 
$18 a gallon, and the people are having to ration water and burning wood.198 Regardless 
of these facts, many citizens admit that ISIS’s heavy-handed rule is more effective than 
that of the Iraqi government.  
Meanwhile, in ISIS’ larger held cities like Ar Raqqa and Mosul, ISIS exerts 
especially strict control. ISIS has a special police force called the Hisbah, which patrols 
the streets and checks to ensure that shops are closed during prayers, men are bearded, 
and women are properly dressed.199 Hisbah also inspect mobile phones and ensure that 
taxi drivers are listening to ISIS radio stations. Additionally, a pamphlet with the 
following laws under which ISIS governs was disseminated in Aleppo: “Drinking 
alcohol: 80 lashes. Slander: 80 lashes. Spying in the service of infidels: death. 
Renunciation of Islam: death. Robbery: if robbery and murder are committed, death by 
crucifixion.”200  
Political Unit 
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ISIS had been conducting governance activities in parts of Syria and Iraq at least 
seven months before Abu Bakr Baghdadi declared the Caliphate in June 2014.201 Around 
Ar Raqqa, Syria and northeast of the city ISIS had already established religious centers, 
judicial power, humanitarian assistance, education, and infrastructure projects.202 In July 
2016, ISIS released a video that broke down the structure of the caliphate.203  
 As one can see, the Khalifah, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, remains the leader of the 
caliphate. Other senior groups involve the Shura Council, which is the leadership body, 
and the Delegated Committee, which supports Baghdadi and the provinces around the 
world as well as the Office and Committees, the Wilayat (provinces), led by the Wali’s 
(governors), and the Dawawin (offices to protect people’s rights).204 The Dawawin is 
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responsible for enforcing brutal punishments for violators of Sharia law. Under the 
Wilayat, the graphic outlines the 35 provinces across the world, including 19 in Iraq and 
Syria and 16 outside the territory the group holds.  
 As ISIS began to take more territory and strengthen its self-proclaimed caliphate, 
a pattern emerged that showed ISIS’ strategy to 
expand and take over new territory, while also 
consolidating its control. ISIS began to 
systematize, bureaucratize and formalize its 
governance structures, ensuring the same 
governance could be operated in each other the 
different wilayats.  
A blog by the Brookings Institute showed 
that ISIS conducts state-building in two stages: 
pre-or partial territorial control and full territorial 
control.205 Within these two stages, there are five 
additional phases of establishing control: intelligence, military, da’wa, hisba (consumer 
protection and moral policing) and governance, which are illustrated in Figure 2.  
 When ISIS first goes into a town, they offer humanitarian aid and improve key 
infrastructure such as water and electricity lines.206 ISIS coordinates with religious 
personnel to distribute aid. If they are in the town for a substantial period they repair 











roads and provide additional services. Delivering key items such as food and water 
requires very little personnel and effort from ISIS, but has a large payoff as the people 
then see ISIS as less threatening. ISIS does not have infinite resources, though, and 
therefore they prioritize cities that are strategically important, giving more benefits, 
whereas small towns of little to no strategic importance receive little help.207  
 After aid is distributed, ISIS conduct religious outreach by calling the people to 
Islam (or in this case ISIS’s brand of Islam). Its administrative department for religious 
outreach – Da’wa – holds special events that educate the people on ISIS’ core beliefs and 
hold small study sessions at mosques.208   
Territory 
  In order to administer territory under its control, ISIS uses a Wilayat system, 
which means state or mandate in Arabic.209 Depending on the control that ISIS has over 
the territory, wilayat can be defined as hard territory or simply as terrain. Since ISIS is a 
non-state actor, its territory is often fluid. In stronghold cities like Raqqa and Mosul, its 
territory is defined by the city limits.210 A sanctuary map produced by the Institute for the 
Study of War on December 8, 2016 shows that ISIS still has control over parts of Syria 
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and Iraq, but also has support in larger areas surrounding its controlled territory.211 
Recently anti-ISIS forces have fully 
encircled Mosul and penetrated the 
eastern side of the city, greatly reducing 
the ISIS stronghold. ISIS has also lost 
most of its physical control over 
Aleppo, and Dabiq while anti-ISIS 
forces have also started to try to retake 
Raqqa to reduce ISIS’s territory and 
influence in Syria.  
Of noteworthy importance is that ISIS’ influence expands beyond its definable 
territory to its virtual caliphate. ISIS’ sophistication and ability to control the internet and 
recruit members through social media is unlike that of any previous terrorist group. Even 
as ISIS loses territory; they are still able to influence and plan attacks globally and gain 
recruits.212 ISIS’ virtual caliphate is much harder to target since it is unconventional 
warfare. ISIS uses this social media medium to expand its narrative and include different 
options for participation. Whether being a passive supporter, or an active member, ISIS 
provides guidance through a variety of different means to promote its message. The use 
of Twitter and its publications Dabiq and now Rumiyah are a couple of ways that ISIS 
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spreads its message.213 In fact, Rumiyah now has a section called “Just Terrorism 
Tactics” that aids lone-wolf actors in choosing a weapon for its attack. 
AQAP 
Background 
AQAP has been rated the most lethal of the al-Qaeda affiliates and was formed in 
January 2009 through the amalgamation between Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-
Qaeda.214 Yemen has a legacy of jihad and in the late 1980s, the Saleh regime fostered 
Jihad in northern Yemen by repatriating thousands of Yemeni nationals who had fought 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. These nationals were dispatched to fight the Soviet-backed 
Marxist governments of South Yemen and to successfully unify the country.215 
The jihad taking place in Yemen attracted the attention of other returning fighters 
from the Afghan war. Foremost among these fighters was Usama bin Laden. Bin 
LadenCii continued to advocate that Yemen play a central role in global jihad and a corps 
of jihadists who trained under him. AQAP predecessor groups include Jihad in Yemen 
(1990-1994), Army of Aden Abyan (1994-1998) and al-Qaeda in Yemen or AQY (1998-
2003).216 One of AQYs most successful attacks was the attack on the hull of the USS 
Cole, which killed seventeen U.S. servicemen.  AQAPs ideology is consistent with al-
Qaeda core’s goal to purge Muslim countries from western influence and replace the 
current regimes in the Middle East with an Islamic state that observes the strictest form of 
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sharia law.217 They also have produced propaganda to encourage Muslims to join jihad. 
Its magazine Inspire has been very effective in promoting its message.218  
Sovereignty 
 The civil war in Yemen has created an opportunity for AQAP to step in and create 
alliances with different tribal leaders to spread its governance and ideology. The 
deterioration of the Yemeni military has allowed AQAP to develop safe havens 
throughout the country and to gather resources found in those areas.219 Adding to 
AQAP’s legitimacy in the region is that many believe that the only justifiable alternative 
to the old government regime and the Huthis is AQAP.  Many people are against the old 
government regime, but also view the Shia Huthis as an invading force.220 AQAP has 
furthered this rhetoric by declaring the Huthis an enemy and claimed that they are taking 
orders from Iran.  
AQAPs primary areas of operation are in al-Bayda, Shabwah, al-Mukalla, and 
Abyan. To further its legitimacy in these areas, AQAP has allied themselves with tribal 
leaders.221 Furthermore, AQAP has taken advantage of rivalries between different tribes 
and has been able to exploit these rivalries to gain more followers and safe havens. An 
example of this is its acquisition of territory in al-Bayda. After AQAP lost territory in 
parts of Shabwah and Abyan as well as al-Makalla, they fled to the mountainous region 
of al-Bayda.  There they were able to exploit inter-tribal rivalries by leveraging access to 
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firearms, funds, and military members.222 In fact, a new approach that AQAP is taking to 
engage tribal members is by giving money in return for a safe haven. 
When AQAP first gained territory in 2011 and 2012, the group created a new 
name to market its governance efforts called Ansar al Sharia. AQAP hoped that by 
rebranding itself, it would encourage people to join AQAP’s jihad.223 Ansar al Sharia was 
featured in the news as well as on Twitter for handing out food to the poor in Mukallah, 
as well as improving electricity in AQAP-governed provinces. 224  
  Also of importance is AQAP approach to implementing sharia law. Instead of 
immediately implementing the harshest form of Sharia law and using brutality to enforce 
it, AQAP leaders have consistently argued that sharia law needs to be implemented 
gradually. Muslims are not accustomed to jihad and therefore need to be taught. AQAP 
differs from ISIS in that they do not publicize punishments in any of its propaganda and 
instead will state what the punishment is and then have a picture of it from afar.225   
Political Unit 
 AQAP is a hierarchical and compartmentalized organization.226 It has four 
separate branches, each with an overall emir heading the branch. The political branch is 
led by Qasim al-Rimi, who filled the position after former AQAP leader Nasir Wuhayshi 
                                                 
222
 Michael Horton. "Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula." CTC 
Sentinel 10, no. 1 (Jan, 2017): 19. 
223
 Thomas Joscelyn. "AQAP Provides Social Services, Implements Sharia while Advancing in Southern 















was killed in a U.S. drone strike.227 The political branch provides overall direction for the 
group, and is dual-hatted as the overall emir of AQAP. When Wuhayshi led the group, he 
was also responsible for approving targets, recruiting new members, and allocating 
resources to train and attack. It is unknown whether Rimi has picked up these 
responsibilities. The second branch in AQAPs organizational structure is the military 
branch, which is responsible for all of AQAP’s attacks as well as building weaponry. The 
third branch is the propaganda branch, which is used to recruit new members as well as 
disseminate AQAPs magazine Inspire. The propaganda branch relies heavily on the 
posting of videos and preachings to inspire radicalization. One of the most successful 
propagandists was U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki who posted videos of himself in English 
to encourage radicalization. Awlaki directed the “Christmas Day Bomber” in 2009, and 
was linked with the Fort Hood shooter in 2009 as well as the “Times Square Bomber in 
2010.”228 The final branch is AQAP’s religious branch, which is responsible for issuing 
fatwas (religious rulings) and promoting and instilling sharia law. The religious branch 
also works with the propaganda branch to justify violence and encourage jihad.229  
One element within AQAP’s organization structure is its intelligence and 
counterintelligence unit.230 AQAP recognizes and emphasizes the importance of human 
intelligence and puts resources into assassinating members of Yemen’s intelligence 
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service that pose threats to the group.231 They also prioritize the formation of more 
intelligence cells that will prepare AQAP for the long war. The cells are used for 
infiltration of tribal militias and other pro-government forces that are fighting the 
Houthis.  
Territory 
As previously mentioned, AQAP has 
a presence in the Shabwa, al-Bayda, and 
Abyan districts. One of AQAP’s most 
successful acquisition of territory was al-
Mukalla in 2015. The city comprises of 
500,000 people and is a major port in Yemen. 
When AQAP controlled the city they 
abolished taxes for the local residents, 
stockpiled hospitals, and imposed fees on ship traffic as one way to make up for the loss 
of tax revenue.232 It is expected that AQAP was able to extort $1.4 million from the 
national oil company in Mukalla and earned up to $2 million a day on its taxes on goods 
and fuel coming into the port.233 AQAP’s eventual loss of Mukalla hurt the group both 
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financially and politically, and yet AQAP was able to build a network in Mukalla, which 
acts as its eyes and ears of the relinquished city.234 
Also of significance is when AQAP learned of the anti-AQAP forces plans to take 
back the city. AQAP responded by withdrawing from Mukalla and moving into Shabwah 
and al-Bayda.235 The map pictured below shows AQAP’s territory holdings in Yemen.  
The decision by AQAP to give up territory rather than suffer heavy losses 
signifies AQAP’s territorial strategy. 236 Instead of holding territory, the emphasis seems 
to be on engaging tribal leaders and offering money, resources, and/or protection for safe 
havens. While occupying cities is lucrative, as demonstrated by its occupation of 
Mukalla, it is more important to keep the strength of the group. As a result, AQAP’s 
territory is fluid.  
Analysis 
The table below gives a summary of the data from the previous section, and is 
divided into two sections. The first explains the characteristics that both attained at the 
initial occupation of territory. The second is what characteristics the group had when they 
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were at the end of their occupation. What is evident that both ISIS and AQAP have 
attained all aspects of a state, but not to the full extent needed to have a legitimate state.  
ISIS 
 When examining ISIS’ efforts to build a state, the possibility remains that they 
could establish an Islamic State. However, it is evident after looking at ISIS’s sovereign 
control, political units, and acquisition of territory, it is very unlikely that they would be 
able to execute a true Islamic State. When ISIS first started acquiring territory, they 
began conducting humanitarian operations like helping to improve essential infrastructure 
and eradicating criminals and drug lords from its area. While the citizens in these towns 
may not have adhered to Salafi Islam, they believed that ISIS would protect them just as 
well, if not better than, the current government regimes. As ISIS continued to control 
territory, its brutality became more evident and frequent. They also increased taxes on 
citizens, causing discontent. While they are able to instill sovereignty and governance 
over its territory and are recognized as being legitimate rulers, there is an increased 
amount of disconnect between ISIS and its citizens that could lead to instability.  
 ISIS’s political units and governance are sophisticated. Through systemization, 
bureaucratization and formalization of its governance structures, each wilayat receives 
the same guidance to execute its mission.  However, as noted in the literature review self-
determination and inclusiveness are factors for having a strong political unit. ISIS does 
not do have these characteristics. AQAP has bodies and institutions to enforce sharia law 
within each held territory. Literature on how to conduct good governance shows a 






state to govern its territory. The Brookings Institute and Atlantic Council report laid out 
four main criteria they considered essential to make governance more stable in the Arab 
world: inclusivity, transparency, effectiveness, and accountability. 237 Furthermore, a 
state’s success depends on self-determination.238 While it is shown that ISIS invades 
territory and some of the people accept ISIS as legitimate rulers, there have been cases 
where people decided that they wanted to leave the territory, and ISIS prevented them 
from leaving. This is because ISIS would lose money from taxation if the person(s) were 
to leave.  ISIS also excludes and marginalizes everyone who does not adhere to its strict 
form of Salafism, without taking into account public opinion. Therefore, coercion also 
plays a large part of ISIS’ governance and control over their people. As mentioned in the 
literature reviews, coercion is not a sustainable form of governance.  
 ISIS’s acquisition of territory has been an impressive feat. Its ability to take key 
cities in Iraq and Syria has demonstrated its military capacity and its ideological 
influence in the region. It is important to note that they have been unable to maintain 
control of their territory, Mosul being the epitome of this. They took the city in 2015 and 
declared it to be its headquarters. Due to its brutality and threat to the rest of the region 
state, actors began an anti-ISIS coalition to retake the city. Key actors include Iraqi 
government forces, Iranian, and Kurdish forces. The literature on territory stressed the 
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importance of military might and the ability to defend territory. ISIS has only been able 
to protect its cities for one to two years and eventually succumb to opposition forces. 
 What is unique to ISIS is its virtual caliphate. ISIS maintains a strong ability to 
radicalize individuals all over the world through its propaganda efforts. Fighters no 
longer need to go to Syria or Iraq to train. Instead, they can learn how to build a bomb 
from an online manual posted by ISIS. This virtual caliphate is difficult for the West to 
target and provides ISIS with opportunities to strengthen its core message. As ISIS loses 
more territory in Iraq and Syria, the virtual caliphate may increase in importance, even 
serving as ISIS’s main platform.  
 Even with ISIS’ strong suits, they are unlikely to successfully build its caliphate. 
Its inability to work with the West and other actors in the region, coupled with its 
brutality towards its proclaimed adversaries would make it difficult to sustain a state. The 
international community has also targeted ISIS and declared the goal of the group’s 
eradication. Unless ISIS changes its core ideology and specific treatment of citizens, ISIS 
will continue to be targeted by the West. 
AQAP 
 The data on AQAP has shown that the group has maintained sovereignty over its 
people, has a political unit, and holds territory. However, it is very unlikely that AQAP 
would be able to form an Islamic State. While the unstable conditions in Yemen present 
and opportunity for AQAP, the group still does not have the capabilities to build a full-






 AQAP has shown that they have been able to exploit the civil war in Yemen to 
create alliances with different tribal leaders. Many Sunnis are against the government 
regime and dislike the Huthis because they are Shia. This presented an opportunity for 
AQAP to step in and protect the Sunnis. AQAP also differs from ISIS in many cases 
because when AQAP enters into a new territory, they do not immediately implement the 
harshest form of Sharia law. Instead, they gradually implement and educate the 
population on sharia.  Like ISIS, they do impose harsh punishments for breaking the law, 
but they do not promote the same level of brutality. Furthermore, when AQAP went into 
Mukalla, they abolished taxes and instead taxed commodities in the port. They were also 
able to improve infrastructure and restock hospitals. This pleased the citizens of Mukalla 
and strengthened AQAP’s legitimacy as a governing body.     
 AQAPs political units are hierarchical and more compartmentalized than ISIS. As 
mentioned earlier, AQAP has four separate branches, with an emir who has overall 
power. Its political unit as a whole is smaller than that of ISIS, but they have had 
significant success in conducting attacks and maintaining holds over territory. They also 
have a robust propaganda campaign that furthers AQAP’s mission and recruits members. 
Moreover, AQAP efforts in intelligence and counterintelligence shows the group’s 
commitment to maintain its integrity and target specific leaders who threatened the 
group.   
It is evident from the literature found on the importance of political units for a 
state that as a state begins to form, the different identities and ethnicities in the state’s 






the state are forced to acclimate. Citizens do not necessarily identify with AQAP’s 
ideology, but they still recognize its leadership because of the benefits that they received 
under its rule. The difficulty with this is that if AQAP does not continue to deliver the 
same services and goods, the population will become increasingly resentful of its 
presence and they would lose legitimacy as the ruling authority.  
 The ability to control territory is also an important factor for having a state. What 
is evident is that currently AQAP is more concerned with keeping the integrity and 
structure of the group strong, then holding territory. However, AQAP has done an 
astonishing job of imbedding themselves in the region through alliances with tribal 
leaders. Yemen is a different security environment because its tribal leaders have more 
influence than other parts of the Middle East. AQAP’s ability to imbed themselves in the 
local population is one of the reasons why the group has continued to evolve. What 
inhibits AQAP from having the necessary territory to build a state is that they do not have 
a strong enough military force to deter its adversaries. They also purposely de-emphasize 
the importance of this ability. Instead, they continue to focus on building relationships 
with different tribal networks and will evacuate the territory when anti-AQAP coalition 
forces enter the area.  
 Because of these factors, AQAP is unlikely to be able to form a true state. They 
do not have a strong enough military force to protect its interests and also rely on 
providing goods and services to the local population to promote its ideology. Moreover, 






targets, Houthis and government forces. Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries 
in the world, which means they would need to rely on imports for many of its goods. 239  
Conclusion 
 It is evident that both ISIS and AQAP have been able to attain certain 
characterizations of a state and have been successful in holding influence in its respective 
areas of operation. However, it is very unlikely that ISIS and AQAP would be able to 
successfully build a state. In both of its areas of operation, there is a conducive operating 
environment for influence, which makes it more likely for them to convert their power 
into a permanent state. Both Syria and Yemen are in a civil war, and Iraq is very unstable 
and having trouble fending-off ISIS. AQAP and ISIS have had sovereign authority over 
its held territories and implemented effective governance. It also set up institutions to 
improve its governance and placed emphasis on religious teachings, improving 
infrastructure, and controlling territory. Nevertheless, both have taken different 
approaches to governing its people and holding territory, and neither have been 
successful in establishing an Islamic State.  
 With this said, it is not out of the realm of possibilities that AQAP or ISIS would 
be able to achieve its state in a form like the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan or the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) in Pakistan. After the fall of Kabul in 
1996, the Taliban became the rulers within the country. They were able to eventually 
control Kabul along with the majority of the countryside. The Taliban was able to 
implement a strict form of Sharia Law, where women and girls were not able to go to 
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school and were banned from working. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was also 
recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It was not 
recognized by the UN. The Taliban’s rule fell after US forces invaded Afghanistan after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks. Using this example if Yemen or Iraq were to continue to 
diminish, and the both respective governments continued to weaken, it could be possible 
that the terrorist’s organizations could set up a governance structure that would be 
respected.  
The FATAs are an area in Pakistan that is governed directly through the Frontiers 
Crime Regulations. The FATAs are comprised of seven tribal districts around Peshawar 
and are made up of ethnically Pashtuns. While the region is controlled by the Pakistani 
government, they have an appointment governor who has federal authority in the area and 
are semi-autonomous. The FATAs also do not fall under the Jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court and High Court of Pakistan. Because the FATAs are still a part of Pakistan, but 
have its own authorities, this is something that AQAP and ISIS might be able to attain. 
From the research and data shown above it is unlikely that they will be able to create its 
own state, but due to the decreasing stability, particularly in Yemen, if AQAP were able 
to acquire enough people and territory it might be able to have similar authority.   
AQAP’s control over Mukalla and decision not to tax the people, instead taxing 
goods going through the port, was supported by the citizens of Mukalla. Yet, the different 
states and businesses that used the port were angered by the high taxes, and eventually 
counterterrorism forces were sent in to liberate the city. ISIS instead heavily taxed its 






taken an inclusive approach to governance or placed emphasis the needs and desires of 
the citizens.  
ISIS has also placed emphasis on holding territory, where AQAP has prioritized 
keeping its institutions in place. In both cases, forces came to liberate the cities from 
terrorist control. This will be a continuing problem for AQAP and ISIS if they maintain 












This thesis has helped to answer the questions of how al-Qaeda creates its 
geostrategy and how influential jihad strategists are, whether al-Qaeda’s uses dissuasion 
by denial as a deterrence strategy and who do they see as its enemies, and finally can al-
Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
attain its goal of establishing the Caliphate. The importance of understanding these 
questions is that it helps to understand the broader discourse of al-Qaeda and how its 
strategy to spread influence and build a caliphate is created. The first two chapters are 
examined through the eyes of al-Qaeda, while the third is the overarching chapter that 
argues that it would be very unlikely that a Salafi Jihadist group would achieve its goal of 
building a Caliphate. The first chapter determines al-Qaeda’s geostrategy and the impact 
of jihad strategist. The goal of its geostrategy was aimed at establishing the Caliphate. Al-
Qaeda’s goal in the second chapter is to deter its adversaries so it can have more power 
and influence to establish the Caliphate. Therefore, since the goal of both of the first two 
chapters was aimed at building the Caliphate, the third chapter examined the plausibility 
that al-Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadist groups could achieve its goal of establishing an 
Islamic Caliphate.  
The first chapter proves that jihadi strategists as well as its strategic culture have 
had a profound impact on al-Qaeda’s post 9/11 geostrategy. Because of the 
decentralization and secretiveness of the group, it can be difficult to disseminate strategy. 






of geostrategy individualistic.  Therefore, one can trace jihad strategists’ geostrategies to 
particular affiliates.  
 The implications of understanding the literature created by jihad strategists is that 
one can now can conceptualize and understand how al-Qaeda forms its geostrategy and 
that its ideology is the main driver for its hatred towards the United States. Al-Qaeda has 
gone through great strides to try to understand how the United States thinks and creates 
its strategy. By understanding how al-Qaeda creates its geostrategy and what its 
geostrategy is, it helps allows for better methods to counter the group’s ideology.  
 The second chapter deciphers al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy and helps to give a 
baseline of where al-Qaeda draws the line in terms of attacks, as well as what al-Qaeda is 
hesitant of. Al-Qaeda has shown that they are willing and have the religious justification 
to use CBRN weapons against the west, but they do not use their acquisition of CBRN as 
a deterrent. The group does, however, use terrorist attacks as a strategy of dissuasion by 
denial. 
Additionally, where al-Qaeda draws the line comes from one of its primary 
concerns of getting lambasted by the media. While the media serves as a platform for 
promoting al-Qaeda’s ideology, it can also hurt al-Qaeda’s image because it broadcasts 
the atrocities associated with al-Qaeda’s attacks. CBRN in particular receives very bad 
media attention because of the psychological effect associated with them. Too gruesome 
of attacks can turn potential converts against al-Qaeda. 
 Understanding al-Qaeda’s deterrence strategy also has important implications for 






the US and al-Qaeda are of different rationalities and the US would not trust al-Qaeda to 
abstain from using the weapons. Therefore, the acquisition of CBRN would not be a 
strong deterrent against the United States. Terrorist attacks, however, carry more weight 
because of the psychological toll that it takes on the American population.  
The third chapter argues that ISIS and AQAP have not successfully built a state 
based on the needed characteristics in the literature review. AQAP is unlikely to be able 
to form a true state because they do not have a strong enough military force to protect its 
interests and also rely on providing goods and services to the local population to promote 
its ideology. ISIS, however, started off its state building efforts strong. When they first 
started acquiring territory, they improving essential infrastructure and eradicating 
criminals and drug lords from its area. As ISIS continued to control territory, its brutality 
became more evident and frequent and they increased taxes on its citizens. This caused 
greater discontent within its territory and people have started to want to leave its control.  
For both AQAP and ISIS counterterrorism regimes have made an impact on why 
the groups have not been able to establish a full-fledge state. This has affected its ability 
to control territory for a period longer than a year and a half. Coalition strikes have also 
hampered the group and forced its members further underground.    
There are also gaps of knowledge in this thesis that need to be addressed. As 
mentioned in chapters one and two there has not been a lot of academic research 
conducted on al-Qaeda’s geostrategy, and even less on its deterrence strategy. Therefore, 
the author relied on primary sources written by jihad scholars to examine its geostrategy. 






literature about how al-Qaeda deters its enemies. The third chapter does have more 
academic research on it, however, it is a very controversial topic on whether ISIS in 
particular has established a State.  
Overall, this thesis provides a framework on how to better counter al-Qaeda on 
the ideological level. Knowing the importance that individual scholars played on creating 
its geostrategy can help the U.S. better understand the way they think and its actions. If 
we can put their strategy and thoughts into context, we will be better equipped to counter 
them. Additionally, a CBRN attack on US soil, while possible, would not be very likely 
due to the history of emphasizing explosives. Instead the biggest threats come from 
strategically timed attacks that could affect US policy decisions, such as those of the 
Madrid bombing in 2004. Finally, when looking at how al-Qaeda and ISIS are trying to 
build its Caliphate one can see that there is an opportunity in the destabilized region for 
them to prosper. They have also been able to embed themselves in the local population 
and gain support. However, the group’s inability to keep territory, with its waving 
support from the population, show that they have not attained statehood and it would be 
very unlikely for them to do so in the future.  
When looking at this thesis holistically, one can see that there are certain strengths 
of al-Qaeda that set itself apart from other Salafi Jihadist organizations as well as certain 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to better counter the group. The table below outlines 









Al-Qaeda Strengths Al-Qaeda Vulnerabilities Opportunities to 
Counter 
Embedding in local 
population 








susceptible to jihad 
Decentralized structure De-radicalization 
programs 
Decentralized structure   
       Table 2: Implications and Conclusions 
Al-Qaeda’s strengths are that it has been able to embed itself in the local 
population and be a protector of Sunni Muslims. This is shown especially by AQAP and 
their ability to infiltrate the different tribes in Yemen. AQIM and the al-Nusrah Front also 
have had success in this. Secondly, al-Qaeda’s strategic thinkers are pragmatic and 
experienced. They lived through and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, as well as 
studied under many of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologues in Egypt. Thirdly, because of 
the instability in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, there is now a more favorable environment for 
the affiliates to operate in. Many of the conditions that al-Suri noted in his book are met 
because of the civil wars and conflicts in the areas. Lastly, the decentralization of al-
Qaeda is both a strength and vulnerability. It is a strength because it is now harder to 
infiltrate the group and understand their operations and strategy.  
The decentralization of al-Qaeda is also a vulnerability because it makes it more 
difficult to implement an overarching strategy and to maintain control over its affiliates. 
This compounded with the death of senior leaders makes the group less effective. Even 
though when a senior leader is killed, there is another one ready to take his place, the loss 






echoed by al-Suri, Naji and Zawahiri’s writings about the different ways to manipulate 
the media, and how the media portrays Jihad in an unfavorable light. It was also shown 
that al-Qaeda takes the media into consideration when trying to use CBRN for offensive 
purposes.  
Knowing al-Qaeda’s strengths and vulnerabilities allows for better opportunities 
to counter the group. One opportunity that would help debilitate the group and exploit 
their battle with the media would be to improve counter propaganda campaigns. Al-
Qaeda and ISIS both have magazines and publications that they use to promote Jihad. 
Having more effective counter propaganda campaign would weaken al-Qaeda’s 
legitimacy in its strongholds.  
Additionally, having de-radicalization programs in these areas would also be 
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